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Abstract 
Modal epistemic logics for many agents sometimes ignore or simplify the distinction between 
the agents themselves, and the names these agents use when reasoning about each other. We 
consider problems motivated by practical computer science applications, and show that the simplest 
theories of naming are often inadequate. The issues we raise are related to some well-known 
philosophical concerns, such as indexical descriptions, de re knowledge, and the problem of 
referring to nonexistent objects. However, our emphasis is on epistemic logic as a descriptive tool 
for distributed systems and artificial intelligence applications, which leads to some nonstandard 
solutions. 
The main technical result of this paper is a first-order modal logic, specified both axiomatically 
and semantically (by a variant of possible-worlds emantics), that is expressive nough to cope 
with all the difficulties we discuss. 
1. Introduction 
There are several well-known modal logics that can represent an agent’s knowledge 
or beliefs about the world. These formalisms help clarify what it means to ascribe 
“knowledge” to individual agents, and they can suggest or verify correct patterns of 
reasoning. Another promising application for epistemic logic is to model systems of 
many interacting agents. Then not only does an agent reason about the state of the 
world, it also reasons about what other agents know about the world, what these agents 
know about other agents’ knowledge, and so on. In particular, such multi-agent reasoning 
can involve subtle issues of naming. That is, how does one agent refer to others? 
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Many treatments of multi-agent epistemic logic have all but ignored this question; we 
explain why below. This is the second of two papers in which we develop epistemic 
logics that include a useful and general concept of naming. Our approach is to find 
simple examples from multiple-agent AI and distributed systems research, and then 
investigate the problems concerning names that arise. 
The first paper, [ 111, investigated naming in propositional epistemic logics. Some of 
the issues raised there are important for this work, and we review these in Section 2. In 
this paper we look at first-order logics. The logic we develop in Section 4.2 is far more 
expressive than any of our propositional logics (although it is correspondingly more 
complex), In part this is for the usual reasons, to do with predicates, functions, equality, 
quantification, and the much more realistic first-order semantics. However, there are also 
more interesting reasons. In this paper we discuss two quite subtle problems relating to 
naming, scope and multiple ways of referring. In Section 3.1 we introduce these issues 
in detail. It is difficult to deal these issues in a general way within propositional logic; 
in contrast, the first-order logic we develop is well suited to handling both problems. 
In the remainder of this introduction, we discuss why “naming” is important in 
epistemic logic, and the two problems of scope and multiple ways of referring. Some 
of this discussion repeats part I ( [ 111)) and we refer the reader to that paper for more 
details. 
In a traditional single-agent modal logic there is just one modal operator (say K for 
“It is known that .“). The general question we ask in this paper and in [ 111 is: what 
happens with more agents? One straightforward answer is to include one operator Ka 
for every agent a in the system, and make minimal changes to the rest of the logic. For 
instance, this is the approach taken in [ 131. However, observe that: 
l The language is fixed, and so the set of agents is fixed also. 
l The only way we can refer to a is by means of the operator Ka. If by “name” we 
simply mean any way of referring to an agent, we see that each agent has just one 
name. 
l Conversely, each name denotes just one agent. 
l The composition of the system and the names of the agents in it are common 
knowledge so that every agent knows them, and knows that every agent knows 
them, etc. 
These assumptions are often quite reasonable, particularly for applications involving 
interactions among a small, fixed set of agents; for instance, see [ 3,6,12, 13,15,30,33, 
34,391. But there are equally many situations where they are much too restrictive. In 
part I, we noted that: 
l Sometimes there is no fixed set of agents. This happens when the composition of 
the system changes (e.g., we remove robots from a factory when they break down, 
and reintroduce them when repaired). This also occurs when an agent does not 
know what the composition of the system is, and so the agent must reason about 
various possibilities. 
l We often need a way to refer to groups of agents; for instance, “every node in the 
network knows that the power will be shut off soon.” 
l We need non-rigid names, that is, names that denote different agents in different 
possible worlds. An agents can reason using these names, such as “the manager”, 
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“the nodes in the network that haven’t failed”, “the most reliable robot”, even when 
it doesn’t know who the name “really” refers to. Note that it is not necessarily 
common knowledge who these names refer to. 
l Sometimes agents must reason about themselves, as in “I know that I must be at 
work before eight”. This becomes an especially important, and nontrivial, issue in 
anonymous systems. 
l Often we need ways of referring to agents that are relative to ourselves (or to 
whoever is making an assertion). Typical examples are “the node to my left”, “the 
person behind me”, “everyone within 10 meters of me”. Also known as in&&al 
reference, this has becomes an increasingly prominent issue in AI planning research 
11,261. 
In [ 111, we present simple propositional logics that have all of these features. How- 
ever, these logics are deficient in other significant, and quite subtle, ways. Let us intro- 
duce the problems with two examples. First, consider an unreliable network in which 
some processes may have failed. Let the formula 4p stand for “pt knows that all correct 
processes received pt ‘s last message”. Suppose that, in fact, the correct processes are pt , 
~2, and ps, and p1 knows that all three of these processes actually did receive the mes- 
sage. Then, under one reading, we could argue that Q is true: p1 does know that all the 
processes which are in fact correct did receive its message. On the other hand, p1 may 
not know that these processes are the only correct ones (and, perhaps, may spend more 
time-fruitlessly-waiting for additional acknowledgments). This observation leads to 
a second reading which makes 4p false at w. All the propositional logics we considered 
assumed that the second of these interpretations i the correct one. Both readings are 
meaningful, however, and we may need to reason about either. 
This example shows that there are different scopes that can be used in evaluating 
names. This can also be seen by thinking about the possible-worlds emantics that 
are often used for epistemic logic. The non-rigid name “the correct processes” can be 
evaluated-its referent determined-just once in the actual world, or else be re-evaluated 
in each situation that p1 considers possible. We call these possibilities outermost scope 
and innermost scope, respectively. ’ Somewhat informally, we may look at the general 
issue in the following way. Although we ask about the truth of some sentence like Q at 
a particular world (w, say), every knowledge operator we encounter in 4p will force us 
to consider possible worlds other than w. If n is a name occurring in cp, which world(s) 
should we evaluate n at? Because n is potentially non-rigid, the meaning of the formula 
will depend on this decision. The problem is that there seems to be several reasonable 
answers: for example, we can evaluate n at w (we call this outermost scope) ; or at the 
most “recent” worlds we have considered (innermost scope); or at any other world that 
has been introduced by a modal operator in whose scope the occurrence of n lies. If n 
is within m such operators, there will be m + 1 choices. In the following, we shall refer 
to all but innermost scope as being varieties of outer-scope reference. In the example 
above, the only modality was “‘~1 knows” and so two scopes were possible for the 
interpretation of “the correct processes”. 
’ These two possibilities for the example are sometimes describe.d as being de re and de ditto reference, 
respectively. We will discuss this terminology in much more detail ater. 
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This observation about scope does not explain all the difficulties that can arise in 
interpreting names. It is not enough to know who a name refers to-which the question 
of scope addresses-because we must also decide how the reference is made. We 
illustrate this with another example. 
Suppose there are two robotic agents, A and B, and A has just broken down. He 
sends a cry for help over a public broadcast system. B, who is the agent responsible 
for dealing with such matters, may or may not have heard. So A’s subsequent action 
depends on whether he can deduce that “I (A) know that B knows that I need help” 
(if this is true, he can just wait, but otherwise he should try something else). 
So what is a good formalization of “I know that B knows that I need help”? That 
is, what sentence should A try to deduce from what he knows? The logic we review in 
Section 2 permits the formula K, KB (Zneed_heZp) , which certainly seems appropriate. 
But the situation is really much more complex, because a formula like this can be read 
many ways. 
One possibility is that it could mean that that A knows that B knows that he (B) 
needs help (the arrangement of quotation symbols in “I know that ‘B knows that “I 
need help” ’ ” captures what we mean here). This is another example of innermost 
scope, because the second occurrence of I is bound by the innermost modal operator 
which is Ks. This interpretation is useful in many contexts, and is all our propositional 
logic allows. But it is clearly not appropriate in the story above. 
The alternative is that the second use of the word or name I refers to agent A; i.e., we 
can use outer scope. The sentence might be read as saying that A knows that B knows 
that the agent named A needs help. However, this is not the only possible outer-scope 
reading. The problem, which we refer to as multiple ways of referring, is that there are 
usually several reasonable ways to read a name using outer scope. Note that A might not 
have sent a message explicitly saying “A needs help”, and instead he might have said 
simply “I need help”. So perhaps B didn’t know that it was A who sent the message. 
All B knows then is that “the agent who just sent a message needs help”. Clearly, this 
is not so good for A. Nevertheless, in some sense A is still justified in saying “I know 
that B knows that I need help”. After all, “I need help” was the content of the message, 
so if B heard it there should be some sense in which B knows it, no matter what B 
can infer about the identity of the sender. Here, B knows that “the agent who just sent 
a message” needs help, and it is true that this agent is A. The point we are making is 
that B might refer to A using some description other than the name “A”. 
For yet another outer-scope interpretation, suppose that B can always tell from which 
room the message was sent, and that there is never more than one agent in any room. 
Then, again, A can say “I know that B knows that I need help”. If the assertion is true 
in the sense that B knows that “the agent in room X needs help”, where A is the agent 
in room X, then A need do nothing more. He does not even need to tell B where he is. 
We still call this outer scope (the “I” refers to A somehow), but we must be careful 
about haw B refers to A. Let us suppose that the robots in this factory are more or less 
interchangeable (they have similar abilities). Then the agents might identify themselves 
to each other using the room they are in or the task they are performing. In that case, 
names like A or B could be similar to serial numbers: useful to us as external observers 
for describing what is going on, but totally irrelevant to the interaction of the robots 
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among themselves. 
There is sometimes an assumption that the “correct” reading of an assertion like “I 
know that you know that I know. . .” has you referring to me by my “proper name”. 
While referring to an agent by his/her proper name is often the appropriate choice, it is 
not always the appropriate choice. In the situation described at the end of the previous 
paragraph, the correct way for robots to refer to each other is using position and not 
using names like A and B. The reading of “I know that B knows that I need help” 
given there is not just plausible, it is in fact the most natural interpretation there is. 
In summary, we have seen two issues that must be addressed whenever we in- 
terpret a name or description. First, we must decide on the scope (in the formula 
KIKB (Zneedhlp), is it A or B who needs assistance?). Second, we must decide on 
the appropriate munner of reference (which description or name is B using for A in 
formula K,KB (Zneed_heZp), when the second “I” is read with outer scope?). There 
are many possibilities for each, and in different situations we may need to express and 
reason with any of them. An expressive formalism should allow us to deal with both 
the issue of scope and the issue of multiple ways of referring in a general way, and 
the construction of a logic that does this is a major goal of this paper. In particular, 
our logic allows us to express various outer-scope readings of a sentence such as “I 
know that you know that I know” yet does not allow outer-scope sentences that contain 
ambiguity. 
In one sense, it is true that the two issues just raised are already quite well known. 
For instance, the observation about potential scope ambiguity with non-rigid names was 
already implicit in Russell’s Theory of Descriptions ( [ 41,421; see [43] for a good 
discussion). In essence, the scope distinction can also be viewed as an aspect of the de 
dictolde re distinction made in philosophical logic. And our concern with how agents 
are referred to echoes earlier controversy about the meaning of de re reference. We 
discuss these ideas, and explain their relevance to this paper, in Section 5. 
On the other hand, our perspective on these issues is not traditional, and this leads to 
new results. First, we note that most philosophical work assumes that there is exactly 
one correct way of interpreting outer-scope (de w) knowledge. In our terminology, this 
amounts to assuming that exactly one “way of referring” is really important. (The two 
most relevant exceptions we know of are due to Hintikka [ 171 and Thomason [45], 
who both consider elaxing this assumption. We discuss their work later.) Even in work 
in artificial intelligence, those workers who have thought carefully and explicitly about 
these issues, in practice end up making the assumption that there is a special set of 
“standard names” underlying de re semantics (for example, see [ 27,3 11) . All this may 
be plausible if the goal of logic is to understand human thought and natural anguage; 
we will not enter this controversy. And the standard name assumption is without doubt 
sensible and appropriate in applications where agents’ knowledge about each other’s 
identities is comprehensive and straightforward. But our interest is quite different. We 
want a general concept of “knowledge” that we can ascribe to agents, as a model of 
their mental states. If we cannot be precise about how agents are referred to, then outer 
scope is quite useless. And when we look at simple systems, there are many instances 
where there really are many (or perhaps no) important ways of referring. So the first 
contribution of this work is that we discuss the importance of being able to reason using 
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all scopes and ways of referring. 
The second contribution is our integration of these questions with ideas in our earlier 
propositional logic, that allows agents to refer to themselves and others relatively (in- 
dexically). We show that this integration can be essential to giving a complete account 
of naming and identity, because sometimes the appropriate “way of referring” is relative. 
We note that, in discussing this, we are continuing ideas advanced by Lewis [29]. 
Finally, we emphasize that we discuss a complete logic, with precise syntax, simple 
yet powerful possible-worlds semantics, and give a sound and complete axiomatization. 
So, even aside from our differences in motivation and philosophy, our work is novel in 
that we give a technical as well as philosophical account of naming, identity, relative 
reference, and scope. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces possible- 
worlds semantics in a propositional context, and summarizes the relevant features of one 
of the logics in [ 111. Section 3 discusses more examples that illustrate the subtleties 
of outer scope and manner of reference. Section 4 is the heart of the paper. In it, we 
briefly continue our analysis of the problems, and then present the logic we propose as 
our solution. Also included in this section is an axiomatization for the logic, examples 
of the logic’s application, and some discussion of related work. In Section 5 we discuss 
the issues we have seen once again, but from a much more philosophical perspective. 
2. Propositional logics and possible-worlds semantics 
In this section, we review two propositional logics. The first subsection contains an 
overview of a logic called S5,, and discusses standard possible-worlds semantics for 
knowledge. Our review of this is extremely brief because the issues involved are quite 
well known. For more details see, for instance, [ 4,14,16,20], as well as [ 11 I. 
The logic S5, is subject to all the restrictions mentioned in the introduction. In 
Section 2.2 we present a simple logic, based on material in part I, that is more general 
in several ways. Some of the new features in this logic, varying domains of agents, 
relative names and knowledge about self-identity, become important features of the 
first-order logic we develop later. 
2.1. Possible-worlds semantics and S5, 
In propositional epistemic logic agents reason about the world in terms of some 
fixed collection @ of primitive propositions. A formula in the logic can be any Boolean 
combination of the primitive propositions in @ (formed using 7, A,V,+,H). In addition, 
for the logic S5, we allow n modal operators KI, K2,. . . , K,, so that if (D is a formula, 
then so is Kip. We read Kip as agent i knows cp. 
An S.5, possible-worlds structure (or S5, Kripke structure) over the vocabulary @ 
is a tuple M = (K r, ICI, . . , Kc,). Here W is a set of states, or possible worlds, and 
r associates with each possible world a truth assignment to the propositions @. More 
formally, 7r : W t (CD --t {true,false}). Each Ki is an equivalence relation on the 
set of worlds W. 
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The intuition is that a binary relation Ki on worlds can represent agent i’s knowledge, 
because it can capture his ignorance about what the world is really like. Suppose that 
the “real world” is represented by w E W. The agent probably doesn’t know this; 
otherwise, he would be uncertain about nothing. On the other hand, some of the other 
w’ will be inconsistent with what the agent knows. So there is some subset of W which 
contains just the worlds that are consistent with the agent’s knowledge. A relation Ki 
can represent his set: we say that {w’ E W : (w, w’) E Ki} is the set of worlds agent 
i considers possible from w. Ici is sometimes called an epistemic accessibility relation. 
Note that this intuition suggests that Ki can be any binary relation over W. The principal 
semantic feature which distinguishes S5, from other modal logics based on the same 
language are the further conditions that Xi be reflexive, transitive, and symmetric (i.e., 
an equivalence relation). 
Although some of the properties of S5, entailed by these conditions have been criti- 
cized in the philosophical literature (see [ 241 for an overview), S5, has been shown to 
be useful and well motivated in the context of analyzing multi-agent systems [13,391. 
We briefly review the motivation here. In any possible world, we can suppose that agent 
i is in a particular local state. We imagine the local state as a structure containing all 
information the agent can reason with and base decisions on. This picture is particu- 
larly appropriate for robotic agents because we can often say precisely what memory 
and sensory capabilities the agent has. Now consider a possible world w, and suppose 
the agent is in local state s. We can argue that the agent must consider possible all 
worlds, including w, where he is in state s because he has no information to rule any 
of them out. On the other hand, he should not consider possible any worlds where his 
state is not s, because the agent can tell that such worlds are inconsistent with what 
he knows about himself. These arguments show that the accessibility relation partitions 
the possible worlds according to the state of the agent; thus, the accessibility relation 
is an equivalence relation. We note, however, that none of our arguments are critically 
dependent on the nature of the accessibility relation, or on the particular logic S5,. It 
would be quite straightforward to reformulate our work in the context of other logics, 
such as the logic KD45, that is often used to model agent’s beliefs. 
A formula p is either true or false at a pair (M, w) consisting of a structure M and 
a world w in M. We define what it means for Q to be true at world w in structure M, 
written (M, w) k cp, by induction on the structure of cp: *
l (M,w)kpiffp~@andrr(w)(p)=true, 
l (M,w) b=“p iff not (M,w) C_ 40, 
l (M,w)~~A~iffboth(M,w)Pcpand(M,w)~=, 
l (M, W) k KiqP iff (M, w’) b (p for all W’ such that (w, w’) E Ki. 
A formula Q is said to be valid in a structure M, written M k sp, iff (M, w) b 4p for 
all worlds w in M. Formula cp is said to be (S5,-) valid iff M ‘F= q for all S5, structures 
M. There are several well-known axiomatizations for the class of all SS,-valid formulas 
(see 14,141). 
Note that the familiar logic S5 is simply the special case of S5, where n = 1. 
’ The cases for the boolean connectives V, =s, ($ are omitted because they arc definable in terms of 1 and 
A. 
318 A.J. Grove/Artificial Intelligence 74 (1995) 311-350 
2.2. A propositional logic with relative names 
We now review material from [ Ill. As we noted in the introduction, S.5, is a 
restrictive logic because it makes almost no distinction between the n agents and their 
names. Three of the more significant weaknesses are the following: 
l Each possible world is a model of how the system might be. In general, the 
number and identity of the agents comprising the system might not be fixed. 
So S5,-semantics, which assumes that there are exactly n agents, is frequently 
unrealistic. 
l It is not always possible to model an agent’s knowledge as a set of worlds that the 
agent considers possible. We want a concept of knowledge that models the internal 
“state” of an agent. Now consider the following example. We have a system S, 
and at time 0 it contains two agents in the same state s. The system is set up 
so that, at time 1, one of the two agents is chosen at random and enters a new 
state, t. Note that after time 1 both agents agree on which worlds are possible; all 
they know is that there is one agent in state s and one in state t. So any possible- 
worlds structure where the worlds are some “objective” model of reality gives the 
two agents identical knowledge. But we don’t want this, because such a concept 
of knowledge clearly cannot model the two agents’ (different!) states completely. 
The problem is that possible worlds alone cannot capture an agents’ knowledge or 
ignorance about who he is. 
l Many applications need relative names. For instance, the denotation of “the agent 
to my left” is not determined just by what the world is like, it also depends on 
who is using the name. One special relative name is I, which refers directly to the 
agent speaking or reasoning. 
Much more discussion of these issues is contained in part 1. Even more detailed 
arguments for the second point, that knowledge should include some component of 
what we call knowledge about self-identity, can be found in [29,35]. A formal logic 
that allows some forms of relative reference, as well as convincing arguments for the 
usefulness of this in robotic applications, can be found in [ 25,261. We also note that 
indexical is a term frequently used to describe objects, like names, that are relative to 
one agent’s perspective. We have used the word “relative” in preference in “indexical” 
in this paper. In part this is to avoid confusion; in [6,33] the word indexical is instead 
used as a synonym for non-rigid. 
The problem of varying domains has a simple solution. For each world w in the 
model, we explicitly specify a set A, which consists of the agents that exist in w. 
The second and third issues are more subtle, but turn out to be closely related and in 
fact share a common solution. Note that standard possible-worlds semantics regards the 
truth of any formula as being determined by the world alone and ignores the identity 
of the agent uttering it. Thus, in S5, the truth of a formula is defined with respect to a 
world. But in order to give the semantics of relative names this is not good enough; we 
must also specify the speaker of the assertion. We can do this formally by defining the 
truth of a formula with respect to a pair (w, a) consisting of world w and an agent a 
(where a E A,,,). All relative names are interpreted with respect to a. More formally, 
there is a name-interpretation function ,X that maps a world, a name and an agent to 
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some other agent in that world. If p( w, n,a) = b then we say that, in w, a calls b 
by name n. Note that at world w every name refers to some agent in A,,,; the logic 
will not allow meaningless assertions about an agent’s knowledge at a world where the 
agent does not exist. Our logic also allows relative propositions, so that the function 
T gives a mapping from proposition symbols, worlds, and agents, to {true, false}. 
For example, we can have a proposition leader which would be true of the pair (w, a) 
(i.e., T( w, a) (leader) = true) exactly if a is the group leader in world w. 
The approach of considering world/agent pairs, which is perhaps the most natural 
way to give semantics to relative names, also provides a natural way of dealing with 
knowledge about one’s identity. We would say pair (w’, a’) is considered possible 
from (w, a) if, at world w, agent a thinks w’ is possible (i.e., it is consistent with 
his knowledge) and also that a might be agent a’ in w’. This last clause lets us 
capture directly u’s knowledge or uncertainty about who he is. Formally, instead of an 
accessibility relation & on possible worlds for each agent a, we have one accessibility 
relation K: which is an equivalence relation on the class of all world/agent pairs. As 
we have suggested, the intuition for this model is that knowledge cannot be completely 
represented just as the set of worlds which is considered possible, but also must account 
for knowledge about who an agent thinks he might be within the world. In our earlier 
example, the two agents would agree on every “objective” assertion about the world 
(such as, there are two agents, exactly one of them is in state t, and so on). They differ 
in who they think they might be: the agent in state t knows that he is that agent in state 
t. 
Using the ideas just presented, we extend S5, to a propositional logic that allows 
reasoning about relative names and self-identity. The language’s yntax is changed, to 
allow an arbitrary collection of modal operators Kn for various names n. The truth 
condition for such an operator is as follows: 
M,(w,u) + K,qpiff M,(w’,b’) kp for all (w’,b’) with ((w,b),(w’,b’)) E 
Ic, where b=p(w,n,u). 
According to this clause, any name n will be interpreted as a relative name. This 
is not restrictive, because absolute names, that should not be relative to the agent, are 
simply the special case where the set denoted is independent of which agent we take as 
a reference point. 
There is one more feature in our logic for relative naming: we assume that the syntax 
includes a special name I that allows the agent to refer to himself (so that we can 
say things like “I know that the agent with name n knows . . .“). Formally, the name I 
always has the interpretation of the identity function; that is, p( w, I, a) = a always. We 
should emphasize that our name I is not intended to be a formalization of the natural 
language word (“I”). The best reading of our I depends on context; for instance, we 
would read K,,K,Klsp as “n knows that m knows that he himself knows 9”. 
Note that the logic we presented in part I was somewhat more general than this 
because we allowed relative names that denoted groups of agents. There, instead of a 
modal operator K”, we allowed En and S,, (read as “everybody with name n knows. .” 
and “someone named II knows.. .” respectively). Part I also contains a sound and 
complex axiomatization and a complexity analysis for this logic. 
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Finally, we remark that part I’s semantics for knowledge about self-identity is certainly 
not entirely novel. Lewis [29] discusses essentially equivalent semantics, but does not 
discuss any specific logic. Lesptrance [26] uses Lewis’s ideas, and gives a rich logic, 
although he does not focus on the issue of naming. We compare this work with ours in 
more detail in Section 4.5. There are also a number of other logics with some apparent 
similarity to our semantics for knowledge about self-identity, in that they supplement 
the “possible worlds” where formulas are evaluated by an explicit context referring to 
where, when, or by whom an utterance is made. Possibly the most well-known example 
is Kaplan’s work on demonstratives and indexicals [22]. Perhaps the less important 
distinction between [22] and our work is that the former does not address epistemic 
modalities, so does not produce anything resembling a logic of knowledge that can 
deal with indexical terms. What is more important is that philosophical investigations, 
like Kaplan’s, appear almost entirely concerned with formalizing human reasoning and 
natural language. The principal question is to ask what the words used in such reasoning 
“really mean”. Neither part I nor this paper is intended, in any way, to address these 
issues. We seek formal logics that are simple, unambiguous, and sufficiently expressive 
to allow us to talk about the states of simple “agents” in terms of some concept roughly 
understandable as “knowledge”. 
3. The problems: scope and multiple ways of referring 
In the introduction we introduced two problems, scope and multiple ways of referring, 
that complicate our goal of finding an expressive multi-agent epistemic logic. In this 
section we re-examine these issues, principally by means of additional examples. 
3.1. Scope 
Non-rigid names have different denotations in different worlds. So when a non-rigid 
name occurs in a formula, which world do we use when determining who the name 
refers to? This is the question of scope. The technical issue is the following. Suppose 
formula p contains names that are within the scope of epistemic operators, for instance, 
q==n,K ll2 . . . K”, p. To determine the truth of 40, possible-worlds semantics will cause 
us to consider many worlds other than the “real” one. Therefore, there can be several 
options to use when evaluating names. 
It is easy to verify that our propositional logic for naming uses the following scheme. 
To determine the truth of 40, with respect to world/agent pair (w, a), we (1) determine 
who nl denotes, relative to (w, a), then (2) find all the pairs that this agent considers 
possible, and finally (3) check if K,,, . . . K,,“, p is true in each of these pairs, using the 
same procedure recursively. It is irrelevant who the names n2,. . . , n, denote relative to 
pair (w, a), because the third step causes us to we evaluate these names later in the 
process, at different pairs. We have called this possibility innermost scope. Innermost- 
scope semantics have a compositional nature, and are simple and well-defined. Another 
extreme possibility, outermost scope, is to evaluate every name nl, . . . , n, once and for 
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all, at (w, a), and remember, somehow, who these agents for later in the evaluation 
process. 
Finally, there are intermediate solutions where a name, for example n,, is not evalu- 
ated at ( w, a), and nor is it re-evaluated at every single world that agent n,_ 1 considers 
possible. Since there are m - 1 preceding names there are (at least) m reasonable pos- 
sible ways to evaluate n,. We call all, except innermost scope, types of outer-scope 
interpretation. 
Our next task is to show that all these possibilities are important. Innermost scope is 
easiest o motivate. Suppose an agent a knows 4p. Of course, this agent can have several 
names: it might have a “proper name” used to sign messages with, a particular physical 
location that can be used as a name, a role in an organization, and so on. Suppose that 
later, an agent (named) m learns about (I’S knowledge. If we think about how m might 
learn this, we realize that what often happens is that m learns that “the agent named n”, 
where n is one of a’s names, knows 4p. For example, a might send a signed message to 
m. Therefore, the state of knowledge afterwards is K,,,K,~ where the name n must be 
read with innermost scope. In general, the simple compositional semantics of innermost 
scope often parallels the process of knowledge acquisition. 
Unfortunately, innermost scope alone cannot express everything. Consider how we, 
as users of natural anguage, use names in knowledge contexts. If I were to assert, for 
example, that “You know that I know what time it is” then the “I” refers to me and not 
the person I’m addressing. So if we were to try to formalize this as K,,,Kl . . ., the name 
I should take outermost, not innermost, scope. Many similar examples demonstrate hat 
outer-scope interpretations are often natural to us. 
Moreover, outer scopes are sometimes useful for concrete domains within computer 
science. Here is an example; we will see others later. An agent a sends a message M 
that will be received by exactly one other agent, although a doesn’t know who this 
will be. 3 Note that the only way a can reason about this other agent is using some 
descriptive title like “recipient-of-M”. Suppose that the information contained in M is 
something that was previously known only to a, and, subsequently, will only be learned 
by whoever receives the message M. For example, M might contain a key that a has 
chosen to be used for encrypting other messages. Now suppose that, in fact, an agent b 
was the recipient of M, and that b then sends some other message M' to a third agent 
c (but b does not tell c about the first message M). Finally, suppose that later c is 
talking with a, and reveals something that proves to a that he (c) received M' from 
someone who saw M. For example, this would be the case if M' was encrypted with 
a key that was sent in M. Although c knows that this someone is b, he neglects to tell 
a. What is known by a and c now? One interesting observation is that “c knows that 
the recipient-of-M sent M"' seems to be true, so long as name “recipient-of-M” is read 
with outemzost scope, because then this name denotes agent b. Agent c doesn’t actually 
know anything about the message M, or even that such a message was sent, so the 
same assertion using innermost scope is false in this situation. So we have produced an 
outer-scope assertion which accurately describes (one aspect of) c’s knowledge. 
3 More precisely, here we mean an agent named a. This distinction is not important to the example, however. 
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However, the example is more subtle than this: simply demonstrating such a sentence 
is not a strong argument that outer scope is necessary or useful! This is because agent c 
knows who sent M’ (b). Consider the sentence: “b is recipient-of-M, and c knows that 
b sent M”, in which everything is interpreted using innermost scope. This assertion is 
true and, furthermore, it is stronger than the previous statement we considered. So if we 
were just reasoning about c’s knowledge, we would never have any need to consider the 
earlier, outer scope, assertion because it is subsumed by this innermost-scope sentence. 
However, and this is the crucial point, we can not avoid outer scope this way when we 
consider a’s knowledge about c. Agent a doesn’t know that the relevant third agent is 
b, so he cannot use the innermost scope sentence we have just seen. He has only partial 
information about c’s knowledge. The easiest thing to do in this case is to say that “a 
knows that c knows that recipient-of-A4 sent M’” as above, where recipient-of-M takes 
an outer (although not outermost) scope here. 
This example is quite involved, but turns out to be quite typical of when outer scopes 
are useful: when one agent has partial knowledge about some other agent’s knowledge. 
In such cases, innermost scope may be unavailable because the agent does not know 
what the right names are. Here, a didn’t know that b was the recipient of M, so we 
cannot easily use innermost scope to describe his knowledge of c’s knowledge. 
Given that-in some contexts-there seems to be a need for outer scope attributions, 
how should we do this in a formal theory? This question is surprisingly difficult to 
answer satisfactorily and occupies us for much of the remainder of the paper. 
To begin with, it is clear that allowing outer scope will require our logic to be 
more complex syntactically. After all, every name can be interpreted in several ways so 
formulas need to provide more information to avoid ambiguity. Hence, formulas will be 
longer than in a comparable logic where one fixed scope is assumed always. One idea 
for an adequately expressive syntax is to mark each occurrence of a name in some way, 
to tell which scope should be used for evaluation (and so which agent the name actually 
refers to), The mark would refer back to one of the enclosing modal operators. 
There are other solutions as well. For example, another recent work attacking a closely 
related issue, but in a very different way (using predicate abstraction) is [7]. And 
perhaps one of the most well known answers to our problem is implicit in Russell’s work 
( [ 4 l-431 ). Russell shows how one can treat terms-names for us-as disguised definite 
descriptions (although when names should be treated this way is another question). The 
expression of such a description involves quantification, but the position of the quantifier 
in the enclosing sentence is not uniquely determined. That is, the quantifier can have 
one of several possible scopes, and each possibility gives a different reading. This 
corresponds exactly to the issue of scope as we have raised it here. 
We do not develop any of these suggestions here, however (although the quantifi- 
cational solution to scope is one aspect of the logic presented in Section 4). This is 
because the scope classification as presented so far only captures part of the story. In 
addition to knowing which agents are being referred to, we also need to know how they 
are being referred to. This is the issue we consider now. 
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3.2. Multiple ways of referring 
We generally have many ways of referring to an object or individual, and in modal 
contexts the choices we make can be important. In simple cases this is well known and 
uncontroversial. Consider, for instance, Russell’s famous example. Russell [41] noted 
that Scott was, in fact, the author of the novel Wave&y, and that while Ring George IV 
certainly knew that Scott was Scott, he apparently did not always know that Scott was 
the author of Wave&y. The main point is, of course, that even if two names denote the 
same individual in fact, we cannot always replace an occurrence of one by the other. One 
way of understanding why this is so is to think about possible-worlds emantics with 
nonrigid terms: it is clearly possible that two terms agree in the “real” world and yet 
have differing denotations in other possible worlds. One can analyze Russell’s example 
this way, giving both “Scott” and “the author of Wave&y” innermost scope (perhaps 
inside a “Ring George knows” modality). This is of course well known. The purpose 
of this section is to show that the possibility of referring to an object in many ways, 
and the consequent subtleties, is not only an issue for innermost scope. Indeed, things 
become substantially more complex for outer scope. 
We begin by considering yet another example, inspired by some recent work in [32, 
401. These papers considered a distributed system, where processes are connected by 
point to point communication lines. However, it is not assumed that there is necessarily 
a global naming scheme for these lines. So while each agent will have to assign a 
number (or name) to each of the communication lines it has access to, a might regard 
his line to b as (his) line #l, yet b might regard the same line as his #3. Such conflicts 
are inevitable, at least initially, because the processes can only assign channel abels 
arbitrarily. 
[ 32,401 also considered a logical formalism for analyzing such systems. The syntax 
of this special-purpose logic fits easily into the framework we gave in part I and 
Section 2.2. Both logics allow relative names like I and #l. However, the semantics 
differ significantly. As we have discussed, our logic preserves the innermost scope 
reading of formulas. In particular, we leave it to the reader to check that a formula such 
as K~KglK,sp is interpreted as “I know that the agent at the end of line #l knows ‘I 
know 40’ “. Thus, in the formula K, Kg1 K~cp, the inner I does not refer to the same agent 
as the outermost I, but rather refers to the agent at the end of line #l. This is not the 
reading of this formula in [ 32,401. If the issue was simply that of differing scope, then 
we might be lead to consider an alternative where the inner I denotes the same agent 
as does the outer; that is, where this symbol is actually evaluated in the context of the 
first KI. Whomever “I” denotes there, say agent a, will also be who the inner Z stands 
for (a again). 
However, this seemingly plausible interpretation does not capture the reading taken 
by [ 32,401. To understand their interpretation, suppose a sends a message saying 4p to 
the agent at the end of his line #l, and then receives an acknowledgment. At this point, 
we might want to describe a’s state of knowledge as “I (a) know that the agent at the 
end of my line #l knows that I know 4p.” Suppose the agent at the end of a’s line #l is 
b. It is then not really the case that b knows that a knows 4p. All that b knows is that the 
agent at the other end of the line that he received the message on knows q~ Although 
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the agent at the other end of the line that b received the message on happens to be a 
in this world, it may well be some other agent, c, in some other world that b considers 
possible. It is this interpretation of K,&tK,q--namely, that I know that the agent at 
the end of my line #1 knows that the agent at the end of the line with the name that 
he gives to my line #l knows p-which is supported by the semantics of [ 32,401, and 
their semantics is designed specifically to enforce this. 
This is certainly the appropriate reading of the formula for the protocol Moses and 
Roth were considering, but it is not the best interpretation for every situation. Imagine 
that the network is upgraded, so that in addition to the point-to-point lines, a process can 
broadcast a message over a radio link, and that such broadcasts may carry a signature 
(that is, some unforgeable identifier). If a broadcasts “I’m a, and I know $’ then 
everyone (including whoever is on the end of #l ) hears this, so a can assert K,K#l K,sp 
again. But in this case, the formula should be read as “a knows that the agent on the 
other end of his line knows that he (a) knows 9”. Both Z’s now refer to the same agent, 
and now actually denote a (or more precisely, the agent with u’s signature). 
So even when we know the scope of the second r-it is to refer to the same agent as 
does the first, that is, it should refer to agent a somehow-there is ambiguity about how 
this reference is made. The agent a can have many names. By which of these names is 
he referred to by the second agent’? 
This difficulty with outer-scope references is even more obvious when we consider 
deeply nested knowledge. Consider a formula such as KIK#I K#~KI(P. We concentrate on 
the second I, and decide that it is to refer-in some manner-to the same agent as does 
the first. Let us suppose that this first agent, he to whom the whole sentence is relative, 
is a. Consider the world w shown in the following diagram: 
That is, in world w, process b is at the end of u’s first line and c is at the end of u’s 
second line; process a is at the end of b’s first line and c is at the end of b’s second 
line; process b is at the end of c’s first line and a is at the end of c’s second line. Note 
that, in particular, c calls the line connecting c and b line #l, while b calls it line #2. 
Now for KIK#I K#~KIc+o to be true at w, we must have K#l K#zKlq true at all worlds 
that a considers possible at w, for some appropriate interpretation of the names #l, #2, 
and I. Since the agent at the end of a’s first line is b, and the agent at the end of b’s 
second line is c, it seems that these are reasonable interpretations of #l and #2, and, 
for the purposes of this discussion, this is how we interpret #l and #2.4 The question 
4This interpretation of #I and #2 is not necessarily the right one: for instance, h might not know that c is 
#2. However, the example is sufficiently complicated already that we ignore this point. 
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still remains how to interpret he inner occurrence of the name I. We could take it to 
be Q, or the agent at the end of c’s second channel, or the agent at the end of the first 
channel of the agent receiving on c’s first channel, or the agent at the end of b’s first, 
etc. All of these descriptions denote a in the actual world w, so apparently are using the 
same scope. But they do not necessarily denote a in all the worlds that a considers that 
b considers that c considers possible. Thus, they result in quite different interpretations 
for the original formula KlK#t KmKpp. The first answer-which is perhaps the standard 
solution-is the least likely to be useful. The most useful, it would seem, are the 
second and third, where we determine a by means of its position relative to c. (We 
remark that Moses and Roth give yet another, somewhat unusual, interpretation to this 
sentence: the channel number b knows a by (here, #l ) is substituted for I in atery 
context-even where #I will not be interpreted relative to b at all! It seems unlikely 
that this was intended. However, the analysis in their work does not require deeply 
nested knowledge, so the difficulties arising in such cases are not especially important 
to them.) 
The example just discussed uses relative names, but this is only because the issue 
may be more apparent in this context, and their use allows us to relate our discussion to 
[ 32,401. But even without such names, the issue can arise. Computing installations can 
be known by the actual site name (company, university, whatever) as well as by means 
of a network address or identifier. If the latter is insufficiently mnemonic then there is 
a difference between knowing something about a set of machines (locations) and a set 
of nodes (addresses). Suppose an agent knows that every computer connected to the 
ARPANET received message rn. In a model where we are considering many machines 
(including ones not connected to the network) “ARPANET seems best treated as a 
group name, and the previous sentence has a clear reading if names are given the 
innermost-scope interpretation. However, it may not have a unique outermost-scope 
interpretation. (Does the agent know something about a particular set of computing 
sites, or about the machines named by a particular set of addresses? Depending on how 
the knowledge was acquired, either could be appropriate.) 
All these examples illustrate the importance of the manner of reference. Any adequate 
formalization for names will have to take this into account. For instance, in dealing with 
a formula like KI K#l KI(P, a general ogic of naming will have to identify both to whom 
each occurrence of Z refers to and to how this reference is to be made, for there could 
be several options. Is it the “I” at the other end of the link? Is it the “I” that signed the 
broadcast? Or is there perhaps ome other way of referring to Z altogether? 
We see now that the brief discussion of scope in Section 3.1 is incomplete. There, we 
implicitly supposed that all we needed to do was to determine which worlds or pairs to 
use when evaluating a name. Given the outcome of this decision, we look for the agent 
denoted by the name there: this agent is who the name stands for. This simple picture 
is noteworthy for the fact that no mention is made of how the agent selected is referred 
to; just identifying the agent itself is supposed to be enough. We have just seen that this 
is inadequate. The choice of which scope to use is indeed necessary to determine which 
agent is being “referred” to. But the word “referred” hides another story, and another 
set of decisions: there can be many ways to refer to an agent. In the following, we use 
the term scope to indicate to the first of these choices: which (world, agent) pair do we 
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use in order to determine the denotation of a name? But, for any outer-scope reference, 
the manner of reference needs to be specified as well. 
In the next section, we present a powerful first-order logic that can express all possi- 
bilities. In [ lo] we explore another approach, which is to convert outer-scope references 
to innermost scope, and express these in our propositional logic for naming. This tech- 
nique can handle several of the examples we have seen; in particular, it is powerful 
enough to capture the various possible semantics for the Moses-Roth logic for relative 
channel names. However, it still has many limitations. The general case simply seems 
far too complex to have a good solution within propositional logic. 
4. A quantified modal logic 
4.1. Introduction 
Our overall goal in this paper is to develop a general first-order multiple-agent epis- 
temic logic. It might seem that this is a straightforward exercise, because most of the 
standard propositional modal logics, like S5”, have quite well-understood quantified 
counterparts. However, these logics are inadequate because they do not account for how 
agents refer to each other; i.e., they ignore the issue of naming. In part I, and in the 
previous sections of this paper, we have looked at several examples and problems that 
arise concerning naming. Here we present a logic that can cope with all the issues we 
have raised. 
Before looking at details, let us summarize the most important aspects of this solution. 
First, we believe that agents (real individuals that exist in a possible world) and names 
(something used by one agent to refer to another, in reasoning) are quite different 
classes of objects. Accordingly, our logic will treat them separately. Second, we cannot 
see any situation where one agent reasons about another agent without the mediation 
of some name or description. The syntax of the logic will be designed to enforce this. 
Third, outer scope seems to be useful precisely when we do not care to be completely 
explicit about which name an agent is using. That is, we know there is a name but have 
partial (or conceivably, no) information about which one. Our logic uses quantification 
to express this. And finally, we acknowledge that the names used are often relative. 
Further, an individual’s way of referring to itself seems to have special properties. So 
the logic will include a version of the semantics for knowledge about self-identity that 
we used for our propositional logic. 
An example of something our logic can assert is: 
3x (Talking( me, x) A 3X ( Location(X) A Zn(me, x, X) 
A ILeVy: ln(me,y,X) * Tall(y)))). 
Of course, in this section we discuss the syntax and constructions used here in detail. 
The In relation is used to say that an agent is associated with a particular (possibly 
relative) name. This particular assertion can be interpreted as follows: I (me) am talking 
to some agent (x), x’s position relative to me is captured by some “location-type” name 
X (for instance, X might be “in front of”), and I know that the agent in that location is 
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tall. The more colloquial reading, “I know that I’m talking to someone tall” is also fine 
as far as it goes, but is misses the point that I know I am reasoning about the agent in 
a particular position. Perhaps I simply see that he is tall, without knowing his “proper 
name” or anything else about him. The interplay of names and agents is important in 
such examples, in order to convey all subtleties clearly and completely. 
4.2. The logic 
Our logic is many-sorted, with the two distinguished sorts agent and name. The 
connection between the two is captured by a distinguished a predicate symbol In which 
holds between a pair of agents and a name (pairs, because our logic will be for relative 
names). Intuitively, Zn(a, b, n) holds at a world w iff b is in the set of agents named n 
by a in w. (The equivalent of In in our propositional logic would be that p( w, II, a) = 6, 
although using In also works if a calls several agents by name n,) 
In the following, V refers to some fixed first-order vocabulary of function and predicate 
symbols (including In). In defining the language, we also assume the availability an 
infinite supply of variables of all sorts. (In later examples, we generally use x, y, z, X, I: Z 
for variables and t, u, T, U for general terms; upper case is usually used just for variables 
and terms of sort name.) 
Intuitively, possible worlds will simply be first-order structures (interpretations) over 
the vocabulary V. More formally, a @t-order possible-worlds structure with knowledge 
about self-identity over V is a tuple M = (W, K, rr). Here, v is a function mapping W 
to first-order structures over V; this T plays the analogous role in this first-order case 
as the propositional rr did before. Formally, T(W) is a function such that: 
l m(w) maps every sort, including agents and names, into a set of objects which is 
the domain of that sort at w. If s is a sort, we will write T(W) (s) as sw. 
l Suppose P is an n-ax-y predicate in V, which takes arguments of sorts st , ~2, . . . , s,, . 
Then r(w)(P), which we will also write as P”‘, is an nary relation on sr x ST x 
***xs;. 
l Suppose f is an nary function symbol in V, of sort s, which takes arguments of 
sorts st , sp, . . . , sn. Then T(W) ( f), which we will also write as f”, is a function 
from sr x s; x - - - x s,” to sw. 
Note that, unlike the propositional case, the set of agents present at w is included as part 
of v (that is, using the notation of Section 2.2, ugentw is just d,,,) . Unchanged from our 
earlier semantics i  the knowledge relation Ic; this continues to be a equivalence relation 
on (world, agent) pairs. The only other condition on these structures i  that the domain 
of names must be identical for all the worlds in W. We discuss the motivation for this 
later in the section. Note that while the class of names is constant, the interpretation of
In (which captures the connection between ames and agents) is determined by T and 
so can certainly vary from world to world., 
The syntax of the language is as follows: 
l The class of term includes all variable symbols, constant symbols (0-ary func- 
tions), a new symbol me of sort agent, and is closed under application of function 
symbols of the appropriate sorts. The symbol me is a special symbol, which be- 
haves much like a constant of sort agent. As we will see shortly, me has a special 
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semantic role, so we have chosen not to regard it as part of the vocabulary V. 
l The class of legal formulas, C, includes all atomic formulas (predicate symbol in 
V plus argument terms of the appropriate sorts, or else two terms of the same sort 
connected by equality “=“). 
l L is closed under the boolean connectives and quantification. 
l If C+P is any formula in C which is either closed or only has free variables of sort 
name, then K,p is in C for any term t that is of sort agent. 
With the exception of the knowledge modalities, this is just usual first-order syntax. 
The introduction of K, is interesting because it is not quite as general as one might 
expect. K, can only occur before a formula with no free variables other than variables 
of sort name. This means that a “formula” like 3x K,P( x) is prohibited (if x is not 
a name variable). Such formulas are said to exhibit quantifying-in, because a modality 
separates an occurrence of a variable from its binding quantifier. Therefore, our syntax 
prohibits quantifying-in for sorts other than names. The reasons for this restriction, and 
its consequences, are complex; we discuss this issue at length later. 
The final formal definitions relate the semantics to this language. We want to evaluate 
sentences-closed formulas-at (world, agent) pairs like w, a. But to give a satisfac- 
tory formal definition, we need to consider evaluation of formulas which do have free 
variables. To allow for this, we also provide a variable valuation function u which maps 
variable symbols into objects from the domain appropriate to the sort of the variable 
(i.e., if we wish to evaluate a formula at M, w, a, U, and x is a variable of sort S, we 
require u(x) E s”). As usual, in the case of closed formulas the function u will turn 
out to be irrelevant. 
The semantic conditions for first-order languages are so well known that we are brief 
here with the standard features of the language. 
l At M, w, a, u, term t denotes a domain element, say t”,w,a,L’. If t is a constant 
symbol, t”,w,cr-L’ is t”. If t is me, then t”*‘+‘,‘,” is a. If t is a variable, t”*w@@ is u(t). 
If t is f( tr , . , tn), then t”~‘+‘*‘~” is f”( t~wxaxu, . . . , t~"'@~"). 
. M, w, a, 0 k t, = t2 iff tyw,'*" = tFw,L',". 
l M,w,a,u + 9 A I++ iff both M,w,a,u + (p and M,w,a,u + +. Other boolean 
connectives are handled analogously. 
. M,w,u,v b Ktqo iff M,w',u',u /= (o for all (~‘,a’) such that 
( (w, tMW4.l~ ),(~‘,a’)) E K. 
l M,w,u,u k Vx qo iff for all o E sIL’ where s is the sort of variable X, then 
M,w,u,u[x/o] k cp, where u[x/o] is just like u except that u[x/o](x) = o. 
Existential quantification is handled by treating 3x cp as ~‘d’x ~rp. 
The first clause here includes the semantic definition for me; the symbol denotes the 
agent a from whose viewpoint w is being considered, and so functions very much like 
the “I” we had in our propositional logic. The difference between I and me is minor: 
the former is a name that usually denotes the identity relation while the latter is of 
sort agent. In practice, the two can be regarded similarly. We can now see why me is 
treated specially. We wish to allow one world (like w) to be considered from different 
perspectives (different agents a). If the interpretation of me was taken to be part of 
r(w) this would not be possible. 
Next, look at the penultimate clause which deals with knowledge, that is, assertions 
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like M, w, a, u k K,p. We see that this is very similar to the propositional case. In fact, 
the difference is really just in the syntax-K operators now refer directly to an agent’s 
knowledge (because t is any term of sort agent). In our propositional logics in part I, we 
used symbols like En and S,, where n was a name that could denote a group of agents; 5 
we can now regard E,,cp and S,,qo as alternative notation for Vx Zn(me,x,n) +- K,qo 
and 3x Zn( me, x, n) A K,qp respectively. (Where names always denote just one agent, 
as in our simplified logic of Section 2.2, both forms are equivalent.) We note that these 
translations would be even simpler if we were not looking at relative names because we 
could then write Zn( x, n) rather than Zn( me, x, n) . 
Finally, we consider the clause for quantification. The semantics for this are, in fact, 
completely standard. The very fact that this is so is actually somewhat surprising and 
discussion of this occupies the remainder of this section. Application of our logic is 
discussed in the next subsection. 
Traditionally, the subject of quantification in modal logic is difficult and confused. 
The principal concern is with quantifying-in, where a free variable is separated from its 
binding quantifier by some modality. For example, the sentence 3x KmeP(x) exhibits 
this (we are using our syntax here, but analogous formulas exist in almost any modal 
language with first-order quantification). This causes problems for at least two distinct 
reasons. The first is more philosophical, and is raised in Section 4.3 and again, at more 
length, in Section 5. Briefly, the issue is similar to our concerns with outer scope. Such 
formulas assert knowledge about someone (some x) but they do not say anything about 
how this agent is actually being referred to (by me, or whoever is doing the reasoning). 
But in this section, let us look at the second and more technical difficulty. In general 
possible-worlds semantics, domains for objects can vary from world to world. Suppose 
we have a logic where 3x KmeP( x) is legal, and where quantification is given the 
semantics standard to most accounts of first-order logic (including ours). Then it is 
conceivable that x becomes bound to an object that exists in the “actual” world w but 
that doesn’t exist in some of the worlds that I (me) consider possible. If this occurs, 
how are we to test the truth of M, w’, a, u + P(x)? If the object that x is bound to 
(i.e., U(X) ) doesn’t exist at w’, then the interpretation r( w’) will not help because 
Pw is a relation defined over a domain which does not include this object at all. As 
an example, consider the case where I come to believe that some particular individual, 
if he exists at all, lives at the North Pole. And further, let us suppose that in the real 
world there is such a person, even though I do not know this for certain. Then, should 
3x K,,NorthPoZe(x) be considered true? Arguments can be made for and against this. 
For although I consider possible some worlds where (the object denoted by) x is not 
even present, in all those worlds where x does exist the assertion NorthPole is true. 
Here we focus on the technical question which is this: what truth conditions should we 
use when evaluating the truth of formulas like NorthPole( 
This question needs to be resolved in any quantified modal logic that allows 
quantifying-in. Several ways of doing this have been suggested (for example, see [ 81 
which contains a good survey of such quantified modal logics). However, we have 
‘These modalities are to be understood as “everyone named n knows” and “someone named n knows”, 
respectively. 
330 A.J. Grove/Artificial Intellipvtce 74 (1995) 311-350 
found that none of the well-known solutions are really appropriate for our goal, which 
is to model actual multi-agent computer systems using possible-worlds semantics. For 
instance, it is possible to avoid the quantifying-in problem completely by assuming that 
every knowledge-accessible worlds has the same or larger domain for objects with the 
sort of x. In our case, where K is an equivalence, this amounts to requiring the domains 
of objects to be constant from world to world. But while this solution is technically 
convenient, for us it is quite unrealistic. We imagine our “possible worlds” to be models 
of concrete systems; it is quite certain that agents which appear in one worlds might be 
absent elsewhere (after all, perhaps agents die or are created, so that the composition 
of the system is not commonly known). Another solution, along similar lines, is to 
interpret all the objects for the sort of x at every world, but not have all these objects 
qualify as values of bound variables everywhere. 6 In a sense, this allows us to say 
that an object o doesn’t exist at world w, but nevertheless still ask whether o possesses 
property Pw. ’ However, we object to this for similar reasons to the “constant domains” 
case. In a concrete system, we can identify properties of agents that really exist (i.e., 
by just looking at the system); we do not want to speculate about the characteristics of 
nonexistent agents! 
There is another class of solutions to the problem of quantifying in, which preserve 
fully general semantics and instead alter the logic. For example, we could say that P(x) 
is automatically false at M, w, a, u whenever x~,“‘,~,” doesn’t exist in the appropriate 
domain at w. This proposal possesses a few awkward and counterintuitive technical 
features (for instance, x = x will not be valid: we refer the reader to [ 81 for more 
discussion). Another idea in a similar spirit is to consider situations like the one just 
mentioned as possessing a third, “undefined”, truth value. Details of such a multivalued 
logic can certainly be worked out, but there is still a problem: for Z&P(x) to be true, 
is it necessary for P(x) to be true in all relevant worlds, or simply not to be false? 
These are different, in general. Any one choice will limit the expressiveness of the logic. 
Our logic avoids this controversy in what may seem like an unrealistically simple 
way. Recall that our language was defined to prohibit quantifying-in, for all sorts except 
names. And it was a condition of our semantics that the domain of names had to be 
constant from world to world. Conveniently, this is just the requirement that avoids any 
difficulty with quantifying-in. This solution might appear to be poor, first because it 
restricts the formulas that can be written (and so, it seems, will give a less expressive 
logic), and second, because our assumption of constant names domain seems unmoti- 
vated (after all, we rejected the constant domains approach in general, in the previous 
paragraph). Yet neither of these objections is really sound. We claim ( 1) there is philo- 
sophical justification for assuming a constant domain of names, (2) quantifying-in over 
names allows us to achieve the effect of quantifying-in over the sort agents, except that 
h That is, each world effectively uses two domains for each sort. The first, which is the same for every world, 
is the domain over which functions and relations are defined. The second, which is a subset of the first and 
can vary from world to world, is the domain of objects over which 3x and Vx range. The second domain is 
intended to be the objects that “really exist”. 
7 Such logics are sometimes said to be based on a variant of first-order logic called free logic. 
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(3) we avoid the difficult and confused consequences of such quantification. We briefly 
address the first of the claims now; the others will occupy us in the following sections. 
Observe that names are part of the basic vocabulary we are using to describe the 
system. They enable us to describe similarities or differences between two possible 
worlds. For example, if agent a has name leader in one possible world, and b has 
this name in another, then II in the first world and b in the second have something in 
common. This is what allows us to make assertions like “I know that the leader knows 
. . . “. In such applications of names, it is just not useful to ask what names “exist” at 
a world. We can sensibly ask who has a particular name in some world, but the actual 
collection of names in use is part of the way we describe the possible-worlds structure 
as a whole. * This contrasts with the sort agents, because the domain of agents is a real 
physical feature of a possible world. It would simply be unrealistic and restrictive to 
assume that the set of agents is fixed. 
4.3. Use of names in the quantified logic 
We now look at our assertion that the absence of quantifying-in over agents is not a 
weakness. 
The outline of this section is as follows. To begin, we briefly give one reason why 
quantifying-in over agents seems to be helpful. In short, this reason is that such quan- 
tification appears useful for capturing outer scope. But we have prohibited such quan- 
tification in our logic. Instead, its effect can be achieved by quantification over names, 
and we show how this is done in general. However, something interesting happens when 
we try to do this. It turns out to be impossible to “translate” quantifying-in over agents 
to that over names without supplying more information. We need to say how agents are 
being referred to, and this ties in with the discussion of Section 3. Quantifying-in over 
agents involves assumptions about how agents are referred to that are not universally 
valid. Our technique using names is more general (because any variety of outer scope 
is expressible) and more perspicuous (because all assumptions are made explicit in the 
formula). 
If we allow quantifying-in over agents, there might seem to be a simple translation 
of outer scope. For example, to express “a knows that b knows that he knows cp”, 
where the “he” is outer scope and intended to refer to a, we could write K,(3x x = 
me A KbKxp). 9 In general, the idea is this: Let 4p be of the form “. . . K@(n) . . .“, 
where n is a name we want to interpret with outer scope and K is the modality that 
opens the scope where the name n should be evaluated. Suppose for simplicity that n is 
a name which denotes just a single agent. Then, roughly speaking, we would translate 
p as “. . . K(3x Zn(me,n,n) A@(x)). . .“. Suppose for now that any technical problems 
that arise in this translation can be overcome. Then, at first glance at least, this new 
* One way of looking at this is to realize that names are typically reifications of properties we ascribe to 
agents. However, we can quantify-in over names, but not over predicates; this is what give names their utility. 
If we moved to a second- or higher-order logic, and allowed quantifying-in for predicate variables, we would 
no longer require names. But our approach allows us to avoid the complexity of such a powerful logic. 
9 We intend the scope of 3x to extend to the end of the sentence. In general where, as here, the appropriate 
scope of quantification is clear from context, we omit extra parentheses. 
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formula gives as a plausibly adequate representation of the outer scope reference to n. 
The variable x is bound to the denotation of n in the correct scope, and so later, when 
x is used in place of the original outer scope use of n, this variable will denote the 
appropriate agent (appropriate, with respect to the scope we wished n to take). The 
difference between the various outer scopes reduces to position of a quantifier (i.e., 
where do we bind x to n?). 
This was only an outline of the approach, but it seems quite straightforward. Why 
have we rejected this approach? We have already seen some technical problems in 
the previous subsection, but even in cases where these can be overcome more serious 
objections remain. Let us now look at why we don’t really need quantifying-in over 
agents, and how we can use names instead. The examples we look at will reveal the 
deeper flaws inherent in the approach just suggested, and the advantages of the technique 
we adopt. 
Before going into this, we need to examine one characteristic of names in our logic. In 
the previous subsection, we considered the possible-world structure to be supplied with 
an unstructured collection of names. But consider our earlier example where processes 
could communicate with each other along point-to-point lines, and also may broadcast 
messages signed with an unforgeable signature. The names here naturally fall into two 
groups: channel-type names, which we denoted #l , . . . , #n - 1; and signature-type names 
which we might list as Al,. . . , A,. Or consider the other example in Section 3: there 
can be names corresponding to computers’ actual sites (perhaps physical location) and 
names which we think of as network addresses. The point is that we often consider that 
there are various different families of names present. In our logic, no extra machinery 
is required to capture this intuition. Among the predicate symbols in the vocabulary 1, 
there may well be a number of unary predicates that take one argument of type name, 
and we can use such predicates to categorize names. For the first example, there might 
be a predicate Cnum() whose intended interpretation is to be true of just the channel- 
type names, and another Sig() for the names we think of as signatures. In this way, we 
can impose whatever structure we require on the collection of names. 
Given this observation, we are now in a position to look at examples where we 
express outer scope using quantification over names. We begin with a straightforward 
example which shows how to achieve the affect of quantifying-in over agents using 
names instead. 
Suppose that, for some reason, we have been tempted to write the formula 
‘dx K,,,eP(x) which uses quantifying-in over agents. We would read this as saying 
that I know, of all the agents that really exist, that they have property P. However, in 
reality, I refer to these agents in some particular way. Perhaps I have a list of proper 
names (of persons), and know that the bearers of these names are P. Perhaps I know 
that the agents in some (physical) locations, relative to me, are P. Or perhaps I describe 
the agents to myself in a way related to appearance. There are numerous possibilities for 
how I actually refer to this set of agents: for definiteness suppose that in this situation 
the appropriate manner of reference uses an agent’s position, relative to myself. Then in 
our logic, we would assume a family of location-type names (i.e., we have a predicate 
Loc( ) that distinguishes them from other names that might be around). For example, 
“3~Meters-in-front” might refer to such a name, and m( a, b, 3-Meters-in-front) holds if 
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b is in the appropriate location relative to a. In deciding to use this family of names, we 
have decided on a manner of referring to agents. Once we have made such a decision, 
and only then, can we use quantifying-in over names: 
Vx (3X Lot(X) AZn(me,x,X) A Kme(Vy : Zn(me,y,X) * P(y))). 
In words, every agent existing in the current world has some location-type name, and I 
know that agent(s) with that name satisfy P. At the price of a more complex formula, 
we avoid the need for quantifying-in over agents. 
Our solution seems involved, but is superior in a number of respects. First, being 
forced to make an explicit decision about how we refer to agents (here, this was to use 
relative position) is to our advantage when there are other ways this could be done. 
After all, the model might well contain many other names, and our formula could easily 
be changed to use these instead. (For example, if there is another family of absolute 
location names which are not relative to any agent, we could use these instead and the 
resulting sentence has a slightly different meaning.) The point of this is that in the 
example, I do not and cannot know simply about some agents, but must know about 
these agents with the mediation of some particular method of referring to them. This is 
a philosophically subtle and controversial point, and we return to it in the next section. 
Another benefit of our scheme can be seen by noting that there is an altema- 
tive to the sentence presented above: the argument of Kme could have been written 
(3y Zn( me, y, X) A P (y ) ) instead. This differs from the formula we gave if there is no 
agent in position n in some worlds, or more than one agent among which some satisfy 
P. In these cases, which is the correct translation? For example, how should we treat 
worlds where X names the empty set? We could ignore them completely, or take the 
formula to be false if there are any such worlds. The original sentence has the former 
interpretation, the new suggestion here corresponds to the latter. We can express both 
possibilities, equally easily. And we are forced to decide which we want; ambiguity or 
vagueness i not possible. 
Next, let us return to one of the examples from Section 3. As we saw there, simply 
writing a formula such as KI K#l KI(P leaves a number of questions undecided. Our first- 
order logic can capture many different readings, and forces all decisions to be made 
explicitly. The innermost scope reading is most easily expressed; indeed, our quantified 
logic uses this reading automatically (because names, and other symbols such as me, 
are interpreted in the latest possible context). The direct translation of this sentence into 
our logic, assuming the innermost scope reading, is 
VxZn(me,x,Z) + K,(VyZn(me,y,#l) + K,(Vz Zn(me,z,Z) a K,(p)))). 
This seems complex, but appropriate conventions in the notation simplify it greatly. 
If we use the abbreviations E and S that were suggested earlier, the above becomes just 
El E#, Elcp. If we then adopt our earlier convention that uses K rather than E when names 
refer to a unique agent, we get K/K#I K,cp which is the same syntax as the propositional 
case and is as concise as we could hope for. 
So innermost scope is easy to express, as we might have expected. The situation is 
more interesting when we look at possible outer-scope readings. Suppose we want the 
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scope where the second “I” refers (somehow) to the same agent as the first. A quite 
general form for this is: 
Vix fn(me,x,l) =+ K,(VJY fn(me,y,#l) 
* 3X (P(X,me,y) A K,.(Vz In(me,z,X) + K,po))))). 
(This could be abbreviated somewhat by using E, S, and other standard simplifications.) 
In this sentence, ‘Iv (X, me, y) is some expression which serves to select the name X 
by which “y” refers to the first agent, x. (That is, we know that the first agent calls 
the second #l. V inverts this: by what name does the second refer to the first?) This 
sentence says that for all agents y at the end of my first channel, then whatever name 
such an agent refers to me by (as determined by W), the agent y knows that the agent 
with that name (me, the speaker) knows p. Different possibilities for how the second 
agent refers to me are captured by different choices of P. In order to express the reading 
of [ 32,40 1, we assume there is a family of names like #I and #2, which correspond to 
channel numbers: these names are distinguished from others using predicate Cnum(). 
If we now take ?P (X, me, y) to be Cnum( X) A Zn( y, me, X), then X will refer to that 
channel which the second agent uses to communicate with the first. We leave it to the 
reader to check that this choice of P does gives us the interpretation of 132,401. On the 
other hand, if we decide that the appropriate manner of reference uses names associated 
with signatures then P (X, me, y ) could be Sig( X) A Zn( y, me, X) (where Sig holds of 
exactly the signature-type names) or simply m( y, me, X) if the model contains these 
names only. Such a reading is appropriate when an agent is identified by means of a 
unique, unforgeable, signature. 
There are some other aspects to this example that deserve comment. We have seen 
that P depends on the two agents involved (me and y) as well as X. In general, P can 
also depend on the name that the first agent uses to refer to the second. For example, if 
x is connected to y by several lines, the name that the first actually uses for y-##l- 
becomes relevant as well, and P could be quite an involved formula. The important 
point is that there may be many reasonable, distinct, choices for ‘ly. In our logic this 
choice is explicitly presented, and all possibilities allowed for. 
Our conclusion is that our first-order language clearly exposes all the options available 
for interpreting a sentence, and allows any of these to be expressed. For any particular 
application, only a limited number of these possibilities will typically be useful; in 
that case, a more succinct notation or a specialized logic can be devised. But in these 
situations, we should not forget that we are making further assumptions about the 
semantics, or else are restricting the sentences that can be expressed. There seem to be 
few such restrictions that are universally appropriate. So it is useful to have a tool which 
clearly reveals these assumptions that are being made, and the ability to do this is the 
principal benefit of our first-order logic. 
4.4. Axiomatization 
The collection of all formulas valid for our semantics has a fairly simple axiomatiza- 
tion. Some of the necessary axioms simply express sound patterns of classical, first-order 
reasoning: 
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(Ql ) Vx p =s- 9 p[ t/x] if t is substitutable for x in 40 (see below for discussion). 
(R3) From 50 + +, infer cp + Vx +b if x does not occur free in 4p. 
Here, x is any variable, and (p and $ can be any formulas in .C. 
In general, if t and t’ are terms, by 4p[ t/t’] (respectively, p(t/t’)) we mean a formula 
like 9, except hat all (resp., some) “substitutable” occurrences oft are replaced by t’. To 
ensure the validity of rules like (Ql ) , we must be careful about when these substitutions 
are performed. A similar situation occurs in classical (non-modal) logic, but our rules 
for substitutability are necessarily more complex. Let us say that an occurrence of a 
term t in formula 4p is free if ( 1) no variable appearing in that occurrence of t is bound 
by any quantifier, and (2) unless t is simply a variable of sort name, the occurrence 
of t is outside the scope of all K operators in sp. Then term t’ is substitutable for an 
occurrence of t in 4p if t and t’ are the same sort, and if both the original occurrence 
of t and the occurrence of t’ that would result after replacing t by t’ ace free in (p. We 
say that t’ is substitutable for t in 40 just if t’ is substitutable for all free occurrences of 
t. The restrictions on substitution to do with variables not being bound by quantifiers 
are required for the same reasons as in classical ogic. The additional restriction, that 
prevents ubstitution within the scope of a modal operator unless both terms involved 
are variables of sort name, is needed because terms can be non-rigid. For example, 
suppose P is a predicate on names, and X is a variable of sort name. Then the sentence 
(VX P(X) + K,P(X)) + (P(N) =s K,P(N)), where N is a name constant, is not 
sound for our semantics (and note that this is not an instance of (Ql), because N is 
not substitutable for the second occurrence of X). For suppose M is a model in which 
the same collection of names satisfies P in each world. The antecedent (VX P(X) =S 
K,P( X) ) will be true, but (P(N) + K,P( N) ) need not be, because the denotation of 
N can vary from world to world. 
In addition to rules for first-order easoning, we require axioms to deal with identity: 
(11) x=x. 
(12) t1 = t2 * (P @ $+2/h)). 
(13) (x = y) + Kt(x = y) if x and y are of sort name. 
(14) (x # y) =+ K,( x # y) if x and y are of sort name. 
Again, (11) and (12) are just like the usual, classical, axioms aside from our adoption 
of stronger conditions on “substitutability”. Axioms (13) and (14) are modal principles, 
and express the fact that name variables are rigid (note that the corresponding axioms 
for other variables would not even be in the language). 
Finally, we add axioms dealing with knowledge. It turns out that the necessary axioms 
are similar to those of the system S5: 
(Al) All instances of propositional tautologies. 
(Ml) &P A K,(P =+ +) * KG. 
(M2) K,~J =+- (p[ t/me] if t is substitutable for me. 
(M3) &P * KtKme~. 
(M4) -%P * Kt%rie~. 
(Rl) From sp and cp + 9, infer 9. 
(R2) From 40, infer K,(D, if this is a well-formed formula. 
In these axioms, t can be any term of sort agent. Also, p and $ are restricted by the 
requirement that the resulting instance be a well-formed formula in C (for example, 
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in (M3) formula 40 must be closed or only have free variables of sort name, because 
otherwise K,q would not be well-formed). In (M2), the definition of substitutable 
guarantees that only those occurrences of me that are outside the scope of every K 
modality in cp are replaced by agent term t. It is not hard to see why the replacement of 
me outside the scope of K’s is needed. For suppose M, w, a, u k K,~J, and t”-w*a*u = b. 
Our semantics ensures that M, w, b, u b 9. But at M, w, b, u every outer occurrence 
of me in (D will denote b, not a. If we wish to evaluate (D from the point of view of 
agent a, we should replace each such me by some term which denotes b. The term t 
is suitable, provided it is in fact substitutable for me, and this substitution guarantees 
M, w, a, u + q[ t/me], which explains (M2). Note that when t is just me, (M2) reduces 
to the usual “knowledge” axiom Kmeq =+ (D, and so the logic of Kme alone is very 
close to S5. 
It is easy to verify that each of these three sets of axioms and rules express principles 
of reasoning that are sound for our semantics. Perhaps surprisingly, the combination of 
the three is complete as well: 
Theorem 4.1. The axiom system consisting of (Al), (Ql), (Il), (12), (13), (14), 
(Ml), (M2), (M3), (M4), (RI), (R2), and (R3) is soundand complete with respect 
to the class of all first-order possible-worlds structures with knowledge about self- 
identity. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
4.5. Comparisons with other work 
The only other formal first-order logic to incorporate (what we call) knowledge 
about self-identity, that we know of, is [ 25,261. Since this is a quantified logic also, it 
is appropriate to compare this work with ours. 
First, Lesperance’s work is in some ways more complete than ours, as it incorporates 
a full theory of time and action. Our work does not address these matters, because here 
we have concentrated on some fundamental issues. Nevertheless, ideas from [ 261 would 
be useful in extending our logic to the temporal case. 
The real difference between Lesperance’s logic and ours is that ours addresses the 
issue of different methods of referring to an agent (i.e., the fact that there is not 
just one interpretation of a name even when the scope has been identified). Although 
[26] assumes innermost scope (just as we do), he allows quantifying-in over any 
sort, including agents. (He avoids technical difficulties because the domain of agents is 
considered fixed. We did not want to make any such assumption.) Because innermost 
semantics are assumed, outer scope use of names would be expressed using quantifying- 
in over agents in his logic. And the difficulty with using such quantification is that only 
one way of referring to agents is possible. Indeed, the whole question of how to refer to 
agents is not explicitly raised in this work. The assumption which allows this issue to 
be avoided is that there is one unique and obvious way to refer to agents. Certainly, this 
assumption is often reasonable and causes no difficulties for Lesperance’s work. But, as 
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we have shown, it does not always hold. 
With respect to first-order epistemic theories in general, comparisons are much more 
difficult to give because the literature on naming and on quantified modal logics is so 
large and varied (we have already mentioned [ 81 as a good overview of the latter). We 
return to some of the issues in Section 5. In particular, work by Hintikka [ 17,181 and 
Thomason [45] is very relevant, but is better discussed there. 
Here, we should begin by remarking that our analysis of quantification for (what we 
have called) names and agents is not entirely novel. The earliest related treatment we 
are aware of is [ 211: the similarity is that Kaplan proposed analyzing quantifying-in for 
agents in terms of quantification over descriptions, and his reasons for this analysis seem 
close to ours. There are a number of differences, however. Perhaps most important is 
that [ 2 11, and apparently most subsequent work, takes seriously the question of finding 
the righr set of descriptions to use, and this concern is perhaps appropriate when the 
task is to model natural language. But in computer science domains the question does 
not seem to be difficult at all: the ways of referring are generally obvious, and there 
may be none, one “best” way, or many useful possibilities. This causes a shift in focus: 
instead of trying to analyze quantifying-in for agents as Kaplan does (in terms of upon 
some special method of referring that it is our job to explicate), we instead want to 
allow maximum generality in how agents are referred to. One result of this is that we 
disallow quantifying-in for agents completely, simply because we don’t want to assume 
that there is one privileged way of referring to agents. 
Another feature of our work is knowledge about self-identity. It is perhaps even more 
obvious in the domains of interest to us than in the natural language case that the 
appropriate “ways of referring” are often relative. So even if a formal logic analyzes 
outer scope and quantifying-in for agents using names and descriptions instead (as we 
do), it is likely to be incomplete if it does not have knowledge about self-identity or 
something similar. Yet we are aware of no other fully developed logic that addresses 
the issue of names in this way which also contains any equivalent of knowledge about 
self-identity. Lewis [29] discusses the problem of referring to oneself, and arrives at 
semantics which are similar to ours in that they can be regarded as being based on 
world/agent pairs. Further, Lewis goes on to propose that de re reference (in essence, 
this is our outer scope) can be understood as reference using some relative relationship. 
Obviously, this idea lies at the heart of our work. Our emphasis on the possibility of 
many equally important interpretations of outer-scope reference, and our work towards 
a formal system for expressing these possibilities, are among the major differences 
between Lewis’s work and ours. 
And finally, we should comment on the contrast between our work with the many 
quantified modal logics that have been presented in the past. In general, the differences 
between such logics reflect differences in semantic or philosophical assumptions. In our 
work, we have the advantage of having quite simple “real world” applications in mind, 
against which we can test such assumptions. Such criteria reveal that much previous 
work is irrelevant to us. As one example, it seems that any work that makes (formal) 
sense out of the notion of quantifying-in for individuals (i.e., agents) will be able to 
do so only by making assumptions that we would not wish to consider. (We hope the 
reasons for this have become clear in the previous sections.) Moreover, even if we did 
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accept such quantification, there are technical difficulties having to do with nonexistent 
objects. As we have seen, many of the proposed solutions to this problem depend on 
assumptions that just are not appropriate to our applications. 
5. Names and reference: a philosophical discussion 
5.1. Introduction: knowledge de re and de ditto 
In the previous sections, and in part I, our approach has been largely pragmatic. We 
considered situations that we might like to describe using a formal theory of knowledge, 
and then produced semantics and logics which accommodated them. But in the process, 
we skirted some interesting and subtle philosophical issues, and here we wish to go some 
way towards remedying this omission. We attempt to give a more complete explanation 
of several decisions taken in the previous section, and also discuss ties between our 
work and questions that have been raised in the philosophical literature. Of course, we 
cannot give an exhaustive comparison. 
This section is centered around discussion of two different type of modality, de re and 
de ditto. In the following we will be assuming some familiarity with these concepts; 
our discussion will be brief. For a more complete introduction see, for example, [ 5,361. 
Precise or formal definitions of the terms de ditto and de re do not seem to appear often, 
and differ from one another when they are given. We begin with de ditto (literally, “of 
words”), because it is more straightforward and less controversial. Intuitively, de ditto 
knowledge is conceptual or intensional; the knower has some idea about what the world 
is like. This idea is represented as an assertion or proposition, which the agent is 
said to believe. Consider this variant of Quine’s example [37]: “I know that there is 
someone who is a spy”, or K, (3x Spy(x)). This is de ditto, because it claims that 
“there is someone who is a spy” is true in all worlds I consider possible. Within a 
formal epistemic logic, de ditto knowledge is generally being expressed whenever the 
knowledge operator occurs before a sentence (i.e., a closed formula). 
The concept of de re knowledge (“of things”) is much less clear. Unlike de ditto, it 
is not necessarily explainable simply as knowledge of some proposition. It also depends 
essentially on the knower’s relation to other objects (see [ 21 for discussion). Note that 
statements that are simply about the world can refer to objects, but do so by using some 
description or name. But de re is supposedly knowledge of objects themselves, and the 
reference does not necessarily involve any descriptive content. One example from [2]: 
on vaguely seeing a man coming towards me in swirling fog, I may plausibly believe 
some things about this man but it is less certain whether I have any unique description 
that I can use for him. Or consider the spy example again. If I had instead claimed that 
“there is someone whom I know is a spy”, perhaps writing this as 3x K[Spy( x), then 
this can be seen as de re because I know of some particular individual who is a spy. 
Note that the de re interpretation of this example suggests that the knowledge involved 
is not a relation between me (the knower) and any proposition (something I know 
about the world), but instead expresses a relation between me, the property of being a 
spy, and another actual person (whom I attribute this property to). 
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Despite the plausibility of this example, it is open to question how much sense the 
concept of de re modality makes (see, e.g., Quine [ 381 for some objections). After all, 
is it really clear how can we refer to an object other than by means of a description? If
I know of some particular spy, it is likely that I have some name or description for this 
person. But then the de ditto assertion “I know that there is someone who meets this 
description, and who is a spy” seems more appropriate. 
We remark that, although the philosophical situation concerning de re is difficult, 
identifying de re usage within a formal logic can be relatively easy. In particular, 
formulas involving quantifying-in are often best understood in terms of de re knowledge. 
The second spy example above is an instance of this, because quantifying-in for agent 
variable x is used to express knowledge about some particular object, without giving 
any description of this object. 
As we have suggested, the utility of de ditto versus de re is philosophically very 
controversial. But in this paper, knowledge is (almost) always de ditto. (Formally, 
this can be recognized in the early adoption of innermost scope and the restrictions 
on quantifying-in in the first-order logic.) We spend some time in the next subsection 
explaining why. We do not wish to enter too deeply into the philosophical debate, so 
the explanation concentrates on concrete and more technical aspects related to our logic. 
Finally, in the last subsection, we reconsider de re once more, and consider whether it 
ever has a useful role in this work. 
5.2. Do we need de re knowledge? 
As we have said, the initial work in part I only dealt with de ditto knowledge 
(although we introduced knowledge about self-identity as a slight modification to the 
basic de dicta concept). It is important o keep in mind that our goal for a theory of 
knowledge is to ascribe some property, called “knowledge”, to agents, that can serve 
as an abstraction of the agent’s actual internal state. This is because we want to use 
knowledge as a tool for explaining action and change in an agent, and the action an 
agent chooses, almost by definition, is dependent only on the state of an agent. Given 
this requirement i  is quite plausible that all such “knowledge” is de ditto, because 
knowledge is internal to an agent’s tate and so consists of ideas about the world, rather 
than being a property essentially dependent on any relation to the world. 
There is a technical argument which makes this clearer, by showing that (in a certain, 
rather weak, sense) de ditto knowledge alone always suffices to model internal (mental) 
states. This argument is the observation that, if the language we use to describe the 
world is sufficiently rich, then any single agent’s knowledge can always be determined 
completely by some collection of sentences of the form Kaqi where pi is closed. 
Such sentences are de ditto, and we can use what we have called innermost scope 
for their interpretation. (The proof of the observation here is that it is always possible 
to strengthen the language to talk about aspects of agents’ states directly. Imagine, 
for instance, that the agents are simple computer processes. In this case, we could in 
principle include a set of proposition symbols Xi, whose intended interpretation is “the 
value of my variable x is i”. Then, because we have knowledge about self-identity and 
these relative propositions, such a language can indeed be made rich enough for us 
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to describe any agent’s state completely as some collection of sentences cpi. But then 
the de ditto assertions Kaqi will unique determine the agent a’s state, and therefore, 
completely determine his knowledge also.) Thus, given a suitable language, de ditto 
knowledge suffices for a single agent. Of course, this is a somewhat weak argument 
because the necessary language can be very low-level, seemingly quite inappropriate for 
human knowledge for instance. But nevertheless, it adds support to the claim that de re 
knowledge is generally unnecessary in our context. 
But two questions arise. Why do the standard arguments in favor of de re not apply 
to us? And second, how do we interpret our work in Sections 3 and 4? Here we very 
briefly look at the first of these, and address the second in the next subsection. 
In the philosophical literature, there are many examples supposedly showing that 
de ditto can be either forced or insufficient. Often these are like the “man in the 
fog” mentioned earlier: there is not a (good) description of name for an object even 
though we would tend to say that the agent knows about the object somehow (i.e., 
the appropriate knowledge is apparently de re). Our response is to note that are far 
less effective if we allow the agent to refer to himself (his identity, his position, and 
perhaps the current time) somehow. We can name the man in the fog as, “the man I am 
looking at”. In other words, once we allow enough indexicality, de ditto will subsume 
many apparent cases of de t-e knowledge. This point has been made often before, for 
example, in [ 2,29,44]. A detailed discussion of this can be found in [44, ch. 8,9], 
which includes an analysis of several standard philosophical examples. 
This explains why we based our first-order logic of Section 4 on semantics which 
included relative names and knowledge about self-identity. It is certainly possible to 
reconstruct our logic, including the technique of using quantifying-in for names rather 
than agents, without these semantic features. But such a logic would be weak. I might 
know something about an agent, but simply have no (absolute) way of identifying or 
naming him; in this case, there seems little option other than to use quantification over 
agents directly. In the logic as we presented it, this will not occur. If I know about an 
agent, surely I am or have been in some particular relationship to this agent. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that I could find some relative name for him. In this way, a need for 
de re knowledge can be avoided. Our position here is almost identical to that taken by 
Lewis [ 291. 
We close this section by discussing a much more technical argument which can be 
imagined, which appears to suggest another role for de re knowledge. This discussion, 
which can certainly be skipped by the reader, is relevant to our treatment of quantification 
in the logic of Section 4. We illustrate the idea as follows. Consider a first-order possible- 
worlds structure M = (W, K, r) with the following properties: first, there an object a 
which belongs in the domain of agents at every world in W, and second, there is a 
predicate P in the language such that that a E Pw for all w. Now consider another 
agent, b say. It might seems to make formal sense to assert that b knows that a has 
property P, because this is so in every world in the structure. But a is a semantic entity, 
not a syntactic one. So it is quite possible that there is no closed formula p capturing 
the idea that a satisfies P. But then is b’s knowledge de ditto or de re? The former 
seems unlikely, because we cannot write K+p for any suitable cp. On the other hand, 
the apparently de re assertion “there is an agent x, such that b knows P(x)“, which 
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can be expressed using quantifying-in for agents, describes the situation fairly well. The 
point of such an argument would be that maximum expressivity requires the de re-like 
construct of quantifying-in for agents. 
But while this argument is formally correct, it has little significance in our context. 
The reason is somewhat subtle. The issue is whether b’s “knowledge” (that a satisfies 
P) really should be considered to be interesting knowledge, of the type that we want to 
be able to express, or whether it is purely technical artifact of the model. We argue that 
it is best regarded as the latter. Suppose we consider another model M’, which differs 
from M in only one detail: in one of the worlds w which b considers possible, agent a 
does not exist. Instead, another new object c takes its place (so that, considered as first- 
order structures, w in the old model and the corresponding w’ in the new are completely 
isomorphic). Between M and M’ little has changed: all worlds are isomorphic and in 
particular, there is no sentence in our language that can distinguish w from w’. And 
yet if we believe that b’s knowledge is different in M and M’ (which is the position 
considered in the previous paragraph) then b itself can distinguish w from w’. Surely 
we should be able to extend the language, somehow, to better reflect b’s ability to make 
such distinctions. For instance, we might add a new term r intended to serves as name 
that b can use for a. The problem is, in general, we cannot extend the language enough. 
Note that there is nothing in the semantics to prevent t denoting some agent other than a. 
So after extending the language, there is still a difference between knowledge of P”(a) 
and knowledge of P(t) , and we can imagine models in which we have one but not the 
other. The point is that, however rich our language and however careful we are to make 
it complete enough to express all the distinctions the agents can make, it can always 
seems as if there is another level of knowledge (which is not de ditto) and which 
requires quantifying-in over agents to express. This extra level of “knowledge” depends 
on which actual collection of agents we choose at a world, and cannot be captured using 
K: and the truth assignment T. Note if our language is rich, this knowledge really can 
have no practical purpose (otherwise, why not extend the language further?). This is 
why this paper regards such knowledge as nothing more than an accidental feature of the 
model. So our logics in part I and Section 4 both have the property that we can choose 
the set of agents at each world arbitrarily, yet whenever two models are isomorphic 
(in an obvious sense, with respect to K and T) then the same formulas hold in each. 
We simply cannot refer to aspects of the model that, quite possibly, have no “real” 
significance. On the other hand, quantifying-in over agents allows this to occur. Thus, 
while it makes formal sense, it is not clear how such quantification is ever necessary or 
even appropriate in practice. 
5.3. Cross-world identity 
Previously we noted that if the language is chosen appropriately, any single agent’s 
knowledge can be completely described using a collection of sentences like Kapi, where 
the qi are closed: de ditto knowledge is enough (although it is interesting that this 
argument fails unless we have knowledge about self-identity). 
But suppose we want to give a partial description of this agent’s knowledge (for 
example, we may want a concise report about the agent’s state, or else wish to describe 
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knowledge held by a second agent about the first). Is de ditto in the above sense 
sufficient? Clearly, the answer is no. Suppose agent a knows who his neighbor is. To 
express this, we might be tempted to write 3x KO( neighbor( me) = x), which uses 
quantifying-in over agents. But this is dangerous. After all, agent a’s knowledge is de 
ditto: there is actually some name or description N such that K,(neighbor( me) = N). 
Quantification is an attempt to cope with our ignorance about N, and so it is reasonable 
that the quantification should still be interpreted as a disjunction over some class of 
names (that class we know N must belong to). The quantified sentence above fails to 
tell us what class to use. We note that this interpretation of quantifying-in, as really 
being quantification over descriptions or names, seems to have appeared first in [ 211; 
see the discussion in Section 4.5. 
We have seen this issue before, of course, in Sections 3 and 4. The solution in our 
logic was to allow names as semantic entities, and to allow quantification over them 
(but not agents). Since the class of all names might be divided in to groups, we can 
quantify over some portion of them when that is appropriate. We conclude this section 
by looking at how this technique fits in to the de relde dicto discussion: it turns out 
that it can be viewed as either. 
First, we could say that knowledge expressed using such quantification over names 
should still be regarded as de ditto. (Knowledge operates on sentences which are 
almost closed; the only free variables are names which have an intuitive interpretation 
as “ways of referring”.) But on the other hand, we might observe that we do have 
some quantifying-in, and we can use our logic to express some varieties of outer-scope 
reference, so it looks somewhat like de re knowledge as well. This second point of 
view is quite reasonable if we are careful. In the remainder of this section, we will see 
what is needed to make this view workable. The result is another interpretation of the 
“different ways of referring to an agent” problem we have seen repeatedly in this paper. 
In the example of a and his neighbor, the de re viewpoint would be to say that a has 
knowledge of someone, i.e., the person who actually is his neighbor. That is, there is 
someone in every one of u’s possible worlds that bears the relation of neighborhood to 
him. But to make sense of such a claim, we need to be able to say how one individual 
(this “someone” a knows about) can appear in several different possible worlds. And in 
fact, it is not clear how we can possibly do this. For after all, given an agent which exists 
in possible world w, there is almost certainly not going to be another agent, identical in 
all respects, existing in any other world (if nothing else, the world it inhabits differs, 
although there are likely to be more concrete differences). So under what circumstances 
do we group two such agents together as being the same? If we want to interpret any 
claim of de re knowledge, we must answer this question. The problem is that there may 
be many answers (or none). 
If we say two agents are the same just if they have certain physical characteristics in 
common (for example, where they are located) then we get one interpretation of de re 
modality. If we choose other criteria, for example, based on the agent’s relative location, 
we get different semantics. This is what happens in our earlier K,K#l Klcp example: the 
agent #l probably knows something about me, in the sense of an agent who is in one 
definite position (channel number) relative to him. Alternatives would be to know about 
me, in the sense of the agent with the a particular signature, or in the same (absolute) 
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position, or in some other sense. These are all different. 
Let us consider another concrete example of the difficulties that arise. Suppose we 
intend to design the protocol for a computer that operates in the following distributed 
environment. The network connects IZ machines, one at each of n different divisions 
within a company, in a ring structure. In addition, each actual machine comes with a 
unique hard-wired identification umber that is available for the protocol’s use. It is 
clear that the protocol we write should not depend too strongly on the precise mappings 
between the actual (physical machines), their order in the ring, and their location. After 
all, each of these may change; this should not require programs to be rewritten. In other 
words, we would like a protocol that does not require any initial knowledge of these 
mappings. 
It seems traightforward to give a possible-worlds structure to model this system. The 
language needs names for each division, names for the possible machine identification 
numbers, and relative names “left” and “right” to capture the ring structure. Each possible 
world is simply some set of n agents (machines) together with a suitable interpretation 
of these names. This model is sufficient o interpret any de ditto knowledge we would 
wish to ascribe. For example, we can easily model knowledge or ignorance about the 
mapping between machine identification umbers and position in the ring. However, 
if we wish to talk about de re knowledge, something is missing: we need to say 
when two agents in different worlds are regarded as the same (consider again how 
we might interpret “machine a knows who his left-hand neighbor is”). Perhaps we 
identify machines across different possible worlds using the physical properties of the 
machine (essentially, the hard-wired identifier). Or it may be more useful to base 
this identification on the company division (perhaps we do not care that the hardware 
changes from time to time). There are other alternatives as well, and none has any 
automatic laim to being the single, correct answer. This is simply another decision we 
need to make as part of the modeling process, if we insist on using de re knowledge 
without explicitly saying how agents are being referred to. 
We can summarize our main points. First, two agents in different possible worlds will 
not be identical in every respect, so there is no a priori correct way of verifying that two 
such agents are really the same. Thus, any claim that two agents are the same always 
involves use of some convention, some similarity criteria, and we must consciously 
decide what these criteria are. And second, any de re statement is making such claims 
about identity (the essence of de re is that something is known about an object, and 
it is implicit in this that the “same” object re-appears in different worlds). Therefore, 
de re only makes sense in conjunction with a cross-world identity criterion for agents 
or objects in general (that is, a means of determining when agents in different worlds 
are similar enough to be regarded as the “same”). If there are many reasonable criteria, 
there will by many different de re readings. This is precisely the same issue as the 
“ways of referring to an agent” we saw before. Instead of saying that we should choose 
a class of names to use, the de re viewpoint is that we need to specify the cross-world 
identity criteria. Classes of names are then best viewed as a way of encoding such 
criteria, within the model. 
Of course, the question of what it means to say that two individual objects, in epistem- 
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ically distinct worlds, are the same is well known to be philosophically contentious. to 
Lewis [28] has said that in fact such objects are never the same: and that instead of 
identity, we should consider when one agent is the “counterpart” of another. Intuitively, 
we should have some (one) fixed criterion for similarity in mind, and two agents which 
are sufficiently close in this sense are counterparts (but definitely not identical). This is 
very similar to the position we are taking here and certainly compatible with our work: 
“counterpart” for Lewis is essentially “sharing a name” for us (although this makes 
most sense when we consider names that denote single agents rather than groups). 
Viewing things as Lewis does leads to interesting conclusions. For example, we should 
not expect distinct agents (in one world) to always have distinct counterparts elsewhere 
(something we cannot escape if “counterpart” is simply “identity”). 
Another particularly relevant work is that of Hintikka (for example, in [ 17,181). 
He looks at world-lines which are, essentially, like our names in that they refer to 
individual(s) in each possible world. (In fact, aside from the fact that our names are 
usually relative, there is no significant difference between a name and a world-line.) 
His interpretation of these lines is that they connect instances of the same individual, 
across the different worlds. In the formal model then, similarity (cross-world identity) is 
defined by the property of sharing a world line. There is no technical reason why these 
lines could not merge, split, or fail to denote anyone in some worlds, and Hintikka argues 
that these are useful possibilities (so there is a similar generality to Lewis’s counterpart 
relations). The most interesting aspect of Hintikka’s work for us is that he comments on 
the possibility of having two distinct sets of lines. That is, there may be two different 
ways of saying what it means for two agents (in different worlds) to be the same, and 
each scheme is useful. His application of this was to note that we may know about a 
person in a descriptive manner, but that we also sometimes identify objects in the same 
spatial location (relative to us, though he did not formalize this). Hintikka’s work is 
continued by Thomason [45], who presents a logic for perception which allows for 
these two “modes of individuation” (i.e., two methods of cross-world identification, or 
“ways of referring”). It is straightforward to see how Thomason’s work extends to other 
contexts (such as where the modality is knowledge, or where there are several other 
modes of individuation). Nevertheless, our logic differs from Thomason’s in several 
significant ways. First, of course, we emphasize the possibility that there could be many 
different ways of referring to individuals, and give a single logic which can handle any 
number of these ways (in our work, the particular ways of referring and their properties 
are determined semantically by the collection of names in the model; in Thomason’s, 
the language includes a new type of quantification for each possibility). Other major 
differences are in our use of knowledge about self-identity (because our modality was 
knowledge, not perception, and it seems that in epistemic contexts we frequently refer to 
others using relative names) and our treatment of quantifying-in (Thomason’s approach 
seems closer to the free-logic treatment mentioned earlier). 
lo In fact, the question of whether we need cross-world identity criteria at all is controversial; 1231 argues 
that we do not (although his concern is necessity, rather than knowledge, and perhaps the two cases are not 
directly comparable) 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have considered the significance of naming in epistemic logic for 
many agents. Our analysis has shown that a multi-agent logic should not ignore the 
complex question of how agents refer to each other; answering this question involves 
many issues that have no counterpart in more familiar theories (such as standard single- 
agent modal logics [4,16]). But even a single agent must refer to other objects in 
its environment somehow, and so most of the issues we consider should be relevant 
even in this case. General relative (i.e., indexical) reference (i.e., to all objects, and 
not necessarily just agents) is especially important in planning; consider, for instance, 
Agre and Chapman’s Pengo system [ 11. Fortunately it is not necessary to construct yet 
another logic for this. Almost any method for naming agents works for other objects 
as well, and so the logic developed in this paper needs essentially no modification. t1 
In particular, any predicate or function with “me” as an argument is naturally relative. 
Lesphance’s work is also very successful at this, and it is perhaps even more specifically 
suited to single-agent applications. 
In part I we developed simple propositional logics that could express many useful 
varieties of names. In this paper we have identified weaknesses in these logics, in partic- 
ular, the inability to handle scope and its consequences. These problems arise, to some 
extent, in single-agent environments, but the complexities are magnified enormously 
when we consider nested knowledge. In this paper we have concentrated on this, most 
general, case. The first-order logic we develop for this combines three powerful features: 
( 1) we make a rigorous separation between agents and names, (2) we impose syntactic 
restrictions which ensure that agents only refer to each other by means of names or 
name-like constructs, and (3) we allow a large variety of names, including relative 
naming systems made possible by the semantics of knowledge about self-identity. The 
general philosophy, if not the actual details, behind each of these features individually 
is not entirely novel. But we believe that only combination of them all is effective and 
general. 
A non-technical contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the considerable subtlety 
of issues involving naming. These can be quite difficult to reason about in the absence 
of any general theory or formal system. The primary contribution of this paper, and of 
the logic it presents, is to provide such a system. In any actual application there tend to 
be special features that reduce the need for such a powerful logic. In these cases, the far 
simpler logics and techniques developed in part I will be helpful. Our first-order logic 
can be used to give a formal specification of the assumptions made by these simpler 
logics. 
We close with some additional comments on this work might be applied and extended. 
First, in [ lo] we consider the (small) changes that need to be made to cope with belief 
rather than knowledge. In [ 9, lo] we move towards a more concrete application by 
examining a specific model of communicating agents. One goal of this work is to 
‘l To name other objects in a similar fashion to agents, we use a new sort for each type of object (analogous 
to the agenrs ort), and a sort of corresponding names. The former can vary from world to world (as with 
agents) so long as we do quantify-in only via the appropriate names, just as in Section 4. 
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analyze the tight link between some names and modes of communication. The examples 
in Section 3.2 are one instance of this, in which each relative name corresponds to a 
specific communication channel. 
It is, of course, desirable to show how any logic might be used as a practical reasoning 
tool. In our setting, we might imagine an agent being provided with a suitable epistemic 
logic and theorem-prover to reason about the world (and other agents) around him. 
We can also consider applications of epistemic logic as a verification technique for 
distributed systems. Both areas deserve further work. However, note that because the 
first-order logic in this paper incorporates classical logic, and has an axiomatization, its 
complexity is exactly the same as classical logic (i.e., semi-decidable). While progress 
in general theorem-proving continues to advance, the possibility of finding simpler 
logics (with faster decision procedures) is probably the more promising direction. As 
we mention above, the real purpose of the general logic would then be to provide a 
unifying framework for interpreting the restrictions which must inevitably be made to 
gain practicality. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4.1 
Theorem 4.1 states that the axiom system consisting of (Al ) , (Ql ) , (I 1) , (12)) (13)) 
(14), (Ml), (M2), (M3), (M4), (Rl), (R2), and (R3) is sound and complete with 
respect to the class of all first-order possible-worlds structures with knowledge about 
self-identity. 
The proof of completeness uses several quite standard techniques (see, for example, 
[ 81) . The novel features are due to knowledge about self-identity and the restriction we 
place on quantification for sorts other than names. We concentrate on the implications 
of these points. 
Following [ 81, we say a set of sentences V is o-complete if, whenever VU {#x q} 
is consistent, there is some variable y such that y is substitutable for x in 40 and 
v u {To[Ylxl) is consistent. (One difference between our proof and those in [ 81 is 
that we require this latter condition only for variables y, not for general terms. This, 
and similar differences which occur later, arise because we do not assume that terms 
are rigid.) If V is maximal consistent as well as w-complete, we say it is saturated. 
Let V be the collection of all saturated sets. For V E 1/‘, let Obj( V) be the subset of 
all formulas in V in which all occurrences of the symbol me are inside the scope of 
some K operator. Some properties of o-complete sets are: ( 1) If V is o-complete, so is 
VU f for any finite set of formulas f, and (2) If V is w-complete and consistent, it has 
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a saturated extension. For a proof of these, see [ 81; very little modification is required 
for our context. 
We define our model M = (K K, T) as follows. First, W will be a set of equivalence 
classes of V, where the partition is according to the relation V E V’ iff Obj( V) = 
Obj( V’). 
For w E W we define T(W) by looking at Obj(w) (where Obj(w) equals Obj( V) 
for any V E w). The objects of sort s are equivalence classes of variables of sort 
s, where the partition is according to x E x’ iff x = x’ E Obj( u). (It is a conse- 
quence of (11) and (12) this relation E is indeed an equivalence). P”( x1 . . . , x,) 
is true just if P(xt , . . . ,x,) E Obj( w). Note that (12) ensures that this is well de- 
fined. Next, f”‘(xt . . . ,x,) is equal to the equivalence class corresponding to y just if 
f(Xl,...,X,) = y E Obj( w). Because of (12) this class is unique if it exists. Fur- 
thermore, existence follows from the provability of 3x x = f(xt , . . . , x,) (using (11 ), 
(Ql), (R3)) and the saturation of V E w. 
Finally, we define K. Before we do this, we need to look at a property of the set 
of agents existing at world w. Let a be an agent in w. Recall that this means a is 
really an equivalence class of variables of sort agent. It turns out that there is a unique 
saturated set V,,, E w such that x = me E V,,, for all x E a. Uniqueness follows from 
(12) and our construction which ensures that all V E w agree on objective formulas. 
For existence, consider Obj(w) U {x = me} for some x E u. This is consistent. (For 
suppose there is some objective cp E Obj(w) with Q + x # me provable. We can 
argue, by induction on the length of proofs, that cp + y # x is also provable for some 
new variable y, and from this a contradiction will follow by (R3) and (11). In other 
words, the inductive proof shows that for any proof of p + x # me there is a proof 
of rp + y # x; each line of the proof has all replacing “outside” occurrences of me 
by y. It is necessary to verify that for each inference step in the original proof, the 
analogous tep in the new proof is also sanctioned; we omit further details.) As well 
as being consistent, Obj( w) U {x = me} is w-complete. (It is sufficient to show that 
Obj( w) is w-complete, because adding one formula preserves w-completeness. Suppose 
Obj( w) k cp[ y/x] for all substitutable variables y. The case where sp is objective is easy: 
by the saturation of each V E w, we know that (Vx 40) E V, but this is objective so is 
contained in Obj( w). Otherwise, we use a similar argument as with consistency to show 
that Obj(w) I- dz/mel [y/xl f or some new variable z. This new sentences i objective 
so we can apply the previous argument, and then re-substitute me for z.) Therefore, 
Obj( w) U {x = me} has a saturated extension which can serve as l&. Conversely, look 
at V E w. There must be some variable y such that y = me E V (due to the provability 
of 3x x = me and saturation of V). That is, V = V,,, for some agent a. We have shown 
that there is a bijection between elements of sort agent at worlds w and the sets of 
formulas V E w. Relative to any particular world w, we can regard an agent in w either 
as a set of variables or as a saturated set of formulas. In the following we regard agents 
as both, the particular usage being determined by context. Note that when we identify 
an agent with a saturated set, the corresponding world w is implicit (being identified by 
the objective formulas in the set corresponding to the agent). 
Given this, we can define K as follows: ((w, a), (w’, a’)) E K: just if 
(9 : Z&p E u} C a’. It is a consequence of (M2), (M3), and (M4) that this re- 
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lation is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric as required. 
To verify that this is a correctly defined first-order possible-worlds structure with 
knowledge about self-identity, it only remains for us to check that the domain of names 
is the same in every world. This is actually not quite true as things stand. Rather, it 
follows from (13), and (14) that, for any world w, all reachable worlds have the same 
domain for sort names. (Here, we say w’ is reachable from w if there exists worlds wa = 
w,w,w:!,..., w, = w’ and agents ao,al,az,. . . ,a, such that ((wi,ai), (wi+l,ai+l)) E 
IC for i < n.) Our ultimate goal is to show that any consistent set of sentences is true at 
some world w in M. As we do this, it will be clear that it is sufficient to consider only 
those worlds that are accessible from w. So if, having found a suitable w, we slightly 
redefine the model so as to consist of the accessible worlds only, then the constructed 
model will have a constant domain of names as required. 
To complete the proof, we need to show a Truth Lemma: namely that, for some 
variable valuation u, then for all worlds and agents (w, a), we have M, u, w, a k 4p if 
and only if cp E a. For o we make the obvious definition, which is that u(x) is (the 
equivalence class of) n itself. In the following, we suppress mention of M, u, and w 
whenever these are clear from the context. 
This Truth Lemma is proved as usual, by induction on the structure of formulas. 
For atomic formulas, including formulas with equality, the truth lemma follows almost 
directly from the construction. Similarly, the case of the Boolean connectives is straight- 
forward. Next, suppose ‘dx P E a. By (Ql), q[y/x] E a for all substitutable variables 
y of the appropriate sort, and using this and the inductive hypothesis we can show that, 
at a, q~ is true of all objects in the domain of that sort. Conversely, suppose 1Vx 40 E a. 
By the saturation of a, there is some y such that -rp[y/x] E a. Therefore, there is some 
object (in fact, the equivalence class of y) where p is false in a, and thus ~V’X 40 is 
true at a as required. 
The difficult case is for formulas K+p, where t is a term of agent sort. One direction 
is quite easy. Suppose K,q E a, and that the denotation of t at a is agent 6. That is, for 
some variable y in the equivalence class which is agent b, we have (y = t) E a. But, 
by (12)) we conclude that Kyp E a also. This is objective, so K,qo E b also (where we 
are now regarding b as a saturated set). But we also know that me = y E b (this is a 
consequence of the way we constructed the bijection between the two ways of viewing 
agents). By (12) again, Kmep E b. Finally, by the construction of K, and induction, we 
see that agent b does indeed know P. 
Now consider the converse, the case where ~K,cp E a. Arguing as above, we see 
that lKmeq E b. We need to find an agent 6’ (i.e., a saturated set) that b thinks 
possible, such that b’ does not know p. To do this, it is sufficient to prove that !P = 
tic, : fGneJl E b) u I-(P) h as a saturated extension. First, note that this set is consistent 
(this follows from (Ml), (R2) using the usual argument for normal modal logics.) 
Since any consistent w-complete set has a saturated extension, we now only need to 
show that ly is o-complete. The argument for this differs between the sort names and 
the other sorts. 
First, suppose P u {~b’x q} is consistent, where x is not of sort names. We need to 
show that there is some variable y substitutable for x in cp such that P U {-q[y/x]} 
is consistent. But in fact, we can chose any variable y other than x or those appearing 
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in (p (recall that in our logic, there are infinitely many variables of each sort, so some 
such y can certainly be chosen). For observe that every sentence 9 in P must be closed 
(except possibly for free variables of sort name, which do not concern us here), because 
otherwise K,,& would not be well formed, and this is impossible given the way we 
defined !P. Using this, it is quite easy to show that P U {-q[y/x]} is consistent. 
Next, suppose W U (4x p} is consistent, for name variable x. For the case of names, 
we note that it is sufficient to show that P’ = {$ : Km& E b} is w-complete (be- 
cause adding one additional formula never destroys w-completeness). Suppose this 
is not the case, so that there is a formula + with Y’ U (4x 9) consistent, yet 
P’ U +[ y/x] is inconsistent for all substitutable variables y. That is, for any such 
variable y, there are t,$, . . . , +L with +I A. . . A @L + +[ y/x] provable. But then (R2), 
(Ml ), and the observation that K,,,&; E b (by the definition of P’) can be used to 
conclude that K,,,&[ y/x] E b. This is true for all y, and since b is saturated, we have 
Vx K,,$ E b. However, it is provable (using (Ml), (M2), (M4), (M2), (Ql), (R3)) 
that (Vx K,,,&) + Kme(Vx #) is a theorem in our logic, for name variables x. (See 
[ 19, p. 1451 for a proof. This formula is known as the Barcan formula.) From this, we 
see that (Vx @) E !P’, which is contrary to the consistency of ?P’ (which follows from 
the consistency of b). q 
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